

ALEXANDER AND THE IRANIANS*

THE last two decades have seen a welcome erosion of traditional dogmas of Alexander scholarship, and a number of hallowed theories, raised on a cushion of metaphysical speculation above the mundane historical evidence, have succumbed to attacks based on rigorous logic and source analysis. The brotherhood of man as a vision of Alexander is dead, as is (one hopes) the idea that all Alexander sources can be divided into sheep and goats, the one based on extracts from the archives and the other mere rhetorical fantasy. One notable theory, however, still flourishes and has indeed been described as one of the few certainties among Alexander's aims.¹ This is the so-called policy of fusion. As so often, the idea and terminology go back to J. G. Droysen, who hailed Alexander's marriage to Rhoxane as a symbol of the fusion (*Verschmelzung*) of Europe and Asia, which (he claimed) the king recognised as the consequence of his victory. At Susa the fusion of east and west was complete and Alexander, as interpreted by Droysen, saw in that fusion the guarantee of the strength and stability of his empire.² Once enunciated, Droysen's formulation passed down the mainstream of German historiography, to Kaerst, Wilcken, Berve and Schachermeyr, and has penetrated to almost all arteries of Alexander scholarship.³ Like the figure of Alexander himself the theory is flexible and capable of strange metamorphoses. In the hands of Tarn it developed into the idea of all subjects, Greek and barbarian, living together in unity and concord in a universal empire of peace.⁴ The polar opposite is an essay of Helmut Berve, written in the heady days before the Second World War, in which he claimed that Alexander, with commendable respect for Aryan supremacy, planned a blending of the Macedonian and Persian peoples, so that the two racially related (!) *Herrenvölker* would lord it over the rest of the world empire.⁵ On Berve's interpretation the policy had two stages. Alexander first recognised the merits of the Iranian peoples and placed them alongside the Macedonians in his court and army hierarchy. Next came the '*Blutvermischung*', the integration of the two peoples by marriage.⁶

Most scholars have tacitly accepted Berve's definition and take it as axiomatic that Alexander did recognise the merits of the Iranians and did try to integrate them with the Macedonians. The extent of the fusion is disputed, some confining it to the two aristocracies, but few have denied that Alexander had a definite policy. The loudest voice crying in the wilderness has been that of Franz Hampl.⁷ Hampl has repeatedly emphasised the arbitrary and speculative nature of most discussions of the subject and the absence of concrete evidence in the ancient sources, and he categorically denies the existence of any policy of fusion. The protest is a valuable warning but in itself it is insufficient. The fact that there is no reliable ancient attestation of the policy of fusion

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¹ G. T. Griffith, *JHS* lxxxiii (1963) 74.

² J. G. Droysen, *Geschichte des Hellenismus* i² (Gotha 1877) 2.83 f. = i³ (Basel 1952) 307; i² 2.241 f. = i³ 404.

³ For a bibliographical survey see J. Seibert, *Alexander der Grosse* (Darmstadt 1972) 186–92. The references which are definitive for German scholarship are J. Kaerst, *Geschichte des Hellenismus* i³ (Berlin/Leipzig 1927) 471; U. Wilcken, *Alexander the Great*, ed. E. N. Borza (New York 1967) 248 f.; F. Schachermeyr, *Alexander der Grosse: Das Problem seiner Persönlichkeit und seines Wirkens* (SÖAW Wien cclxxxv: 1973) 355, 472, 479–83 (exposition unchanged from the first edn: Graz 1949). For recent statement of orthodoxy see F. Altheim–R. Stiehl, *Geschichte Mittelasiens in Altertum* (Berlin 1970) 212 ff., esp. 217; H. E. Stier, *Welteroberung und Weltfriede im Wirken Al. d. Gr. (Rhein.-Westfäl. Akad. Wiss. Vorträge G 187: 1972)* 38–41. For the diffusion of the idea outside its German context see G. Radet, *Alexandre le Grand* (Paris 1931) 342

f.; W. W. Tarn, *Alexander the Great* (Cambridge 1948) i 111, 137 f.; J. R. Hamilton, *Alexander the Great* (London 1973) 105, 163.

⁴ *Op. cit.* (n. 3) ii 399–449 (the definitive statement). Tarn separated the two idea of brotherhood and fusion, but he used precisely the same evidence to argue for universal brotherhood that others had used to support the policy of fusion. For the counter-arguments, which are conclusive, see E. Badian, 'Alexander the Great and the Unity of Mankind', *Historia* vii (1958) 425–44 with P. Merlan, *CPh* xlv (1950) 161–6.

⁵ H. Berve, 'Die Verschmelzungspolitik Alexanders des Grossen', *Klio* xxxi (1938) 135–68. Berve took his view to extreme lengths, even arguing that the concubines in Alexander's army train were exclusively Iranian (158 f.).

⁶ Cf. Berve (n. 5) 136 for the full definition.

⁷ F. Hampl, 'Alexander der Grosse und die Beurteilung geschichtlicher Persönlichkeiten', *La Nouvelle Clio* vi (1954) 115–23; cf. *Studies presented to D. M. Robinson* ii (Washington 1953) 319 f. For some pragmatic recent views which I would largely endorse, see E. Badian, *Studies in Greek & Roman History* (Oxford 1964) 201; P. Green, *Alexander of Macedon* (1974) 446.

does not prove that no such policy existed; it merely makes the case more complex. The attested actions of Alexander may still be explicable only on the assumption that he had some definite policy of integration. This is a viable hypothesis, but it must be tested rigorously. We need to examine precisely what the ancient sources say and not interpolate them with our own interpretations or wishful thinking; and above all the evidence needs to be treated in its historical context, not thrown together haphazardly to buttress some abstract concept which attracts us for sentimental reasons.

There are two passages in the sources that suggest that Alexander had some ideas of fusing together the Macedonians and Persians. Foremost comes the famous prayer of reconciliation after the Opis mutiny (late summer 324). According to Arrian Alexander held a sacrifice at which all participants, Macedonians, Persians and representatives of other nations, sat around Alexander while he and his entourage poured libations from the same vessel. The king made a prayer whose main burden was 'concord and community in empire for Macedonians and Persians' (*ὁμόνοιαν τε καὶ κοινωνίαν τῆς ἀρχῆς Μακεδόσι καὶ Πέρσαις*).⁸ The two concepts, concord and community, are tied together grammatically and contextually. The background of the prayer was mutiny, a mutiny caused in part at least by Macedonian resentment of Persians and crushed by Alexander turning towards his Persians and creating a new court and army structure composed totally of Persians.⁹ The stratagem had been entirely successful and the Macedonians capitulated as soon as Alexander began his distribution of army commands to notable Persians. There was certainly Macedonian fear and resentment of the Persians around Alexander and the king played upon these emotions to destroy the mutiny. There was every reason under the circumstances for a ceremony of reconciliation and a prayer for concord. Concord is associated with community in empire, and there is no doubt that Arrian means the sharing of command in Alexander's empire.¹⁰ The terminology is vague and imprecise, as so often with Arrian, but there is no reason to give the prayer a universal significance. Alexander may be referring to the satrapies of the empire which had been and were to continue to be governed both by Macedonians and Iranians.¹¹ There may even be a reference to the army commands recently conferred upon Persians and a covert threat that he would repeat his action if there were further trouble. The prayer and its context are primary evidence for bad blood between Macedonians and Iranians and Alexander's desire to use some at least of both races in the administration of the empire. They do not give any support for a general policy of fusion.¹²

Diodorus is more explicit. In the context of the notorious *hypomnemata*, the alleged last plans of Alexander presented to the Macedonian army by Perdikkas, came a proposal to synoecise cities and transplant populations from Europe to Asia 'to bring the continents to common unity and friendly kinship' by means of intermarriage and ties of community.¹³ We have here two things, a proposal to found cities and transplant populations, and an interpretation of that proposal. The interpretation is unlikely to have been embodied in the original plans submitted by Perdikkas, and like the puerile note a few sentences later (that the Pyramids were accounted among the Seven Wonders) it is most probably a comment either by Diodorus or his source.¹⁴ Now there is little or

⁸ Arr. vii 11.8–9. For the grammatical structure see the discussion of Badian (n. 4) 430 f.

⁹ For the Macedonian resentment see Arr. vii 6.1–5; 8.2. For the crushing of the mutiny see Arr. vii 11.1–4; Curt. x 3.5–6; Diod. xvii 109.3; Plut. *Al.* 71.4; Justin xii 12.1–6.

¹⁰ Cf. Arr. iii 21.5: *καὶ διασώζειν ἐς τὸ κοινὸν τὴν ἀρχήν* (the regicides with Bessus).

¹¹ For examples of *ἀρχή* as a synonym of satrapy see Arr. i 17.7, 23.8; vi 29.1. In Arrian *ἀρχή* implies rule over subjects (cf. iv 20.3 where the Persian empire is described as *Περσῶν τε καὶ Μήδων τὴν ἀρχήν*, rule over Persians and Medes). I cannot see how the Opis prayer can imply anything other than that the Persians and Macedonians were to rule jointly over subject peoples. The distinctions hitherto made between *ἀρχή* as 'rule' and *ἀρχή* as 'realm' are meaningless: Tarn (n. 3) ii 443 f.; F. Wüst, *Historia* ii (1953) 429; cf. Badian (n. 4) 431.

¹² Arrian makes it clear that the participants at the feast were clearly divided by their national origins. Far from intermingling the Persians and Macedonians were separated from each other and the Macedonians alone were in the king's entourage (*ἀμφ' αὐτὸν μὲν Μακεδόνων, ἐν δὲ τῷ ἐφεξῆς τούτων Περσῶν*). Cf. Badian (n. 4) 429 f.

¹³ Diod. xviii 4.4: *ὅπως τὰς μεγίστας ἡπείρους . . . εἰς κοινὴν ὁμόνοιαν καὶ συγγενικὴν φιλίαν καταστήσῃ*.

¹⁴ So Badian, *HSCP* lxxii (1968) 194–5. Even if the proposals did contain statements of intent, those statements were transmitted by Perdikkas and cannot be directly attributed to Alexander himself. Cf. Schachermeyr, *Alexander in Babylon* (SÖAWWien cclxviii. 3: 1970) 192: 'natürlich hat Perdikkas am Heer nicht ganz Schriftsätze vorgelesen, sondern das meiste einfach paraphrasiert'.

no evidence that Diodorus had a personal interest in Alexander as an apostle of international unity¹⁵ and the overwhelming probability is that the comment comes from his immediate source, Hieronymus of Cardia.¹⁶ Hieronymus was a contemporary of Alexander but his history was written towards the end of his prodigiously long life and covered events at least to 272.¹⁷ His recollections of Alexander were now distant and his views of the king's motives perhaps affected by fifty years of experience and reflection. He may have considered that Alexander's shifts of population were designed to bring about greater community between races,¹⁸ but nothing suggests that Alexander shared his views. What is more, the authenticity of the *hypomnemata* is a notorious crux. It is certainly possible that Perdicas included fictitious proposals which he knew would antagonise the army in order to induce them to revoke the whole of Alexander's *acta*.¹⁹ If so, those proposals would have been couched in the most provocative terms. There is, then, no certainty that even the original proposal to transplant populations emanates from Alexander, let alone the parenthetical comment. And the force of the comment is that Alexander envisaged a general spirit of unity among all his subjects, Greek and barbarian; it is not in any sense a plan to combine Macedonians and Persians as a joint ruling class. The only connection with the Opis prayer is the fact that the concept of *ὁμόνοια* occurs in both passages!

The next relevant observation comes from Eratosthenes, who observed that Alexander ignored advice to treat the Greeks as friends and barbarians as enemies, preferring to welcome all possible men of fair repute and be their benefactor.²⁰ On the surface Eratosthenes' comment has nothing to do with any policy of fusion; it is merely the just observation that Alexander was catholic in his benefactions and did not treat the conquered peoples with hostility. There is no hint here of a proposed union of races. But discussion has been unforgivably confused by the belief that Eratosthenes lies at the base of Plutarch's exposition in the first of his speeches *de Alexandri fortuna*. As is well known, this essay is the prime source for the view of Alexander as the reconciler of mankind. In a famous passage of rhetoric Plutarch tells of the rejection of Aristotle's advice to treat the Greeks *ἡγεμονικῶς*; Alexander blended all men together, mixing their lives, marriages and ways of life in a *krater* of friendship and making his only distinction between Greek and barbarian a man's virtue or vice.²¹ After the recent analyses by Badian and Hamilton²² there should be no question that the whole shaping of the passage is Plutarch's own, designed to show that Alexander achieved in fact the single polity which Zeno advocated. He may have drawn on Eratosthenes, but nothing suggests that the passage as a whole is an extract or summary. In particular there is no reason to believe that Eratosthenes used the metaphor of mixing.

There is still a tendency to argue that Eratosthenes described a policy of fusion. Two chapters later Plutarch explicitly cites him on the subject of Alexander's court dress, a mixture of Persian and Macedonian elements.²³ He goes on to explain that the object was to win the respect of the subject peoples and further the aim of a single law and polity for all mankind. But there is nothing to suggest that Plutarch's interpretation of the mixed dress comes from Eratosthenes. The whole passage is designed to buttress the paradoxical thesis that Alexander was a philosopher in arms and seeking the reconciliation of mankind which was merely preached as an ideal by conventional philosophers. The concrete examples of the Susa marriages and the adoption of mixed court dress are chosen as examples of his achievement of *κοινωνία* and the choice is Plutarch's own. The

¹⁵ At xvii 110.2 he refers to the mixed phalanx of Persians and Macedonians as *κεκραμένην καὶ ἀρμόζουσαν τῇ ἰδίᾳ προαιρέσει*, but there is no other reference to any deliberate policy of fusion.

¹⁶ Cf. Schachermeyr, *JÖAI* xli (1954) 120–3; Badian (n. 14) 183 ff., both conclusive against Tarn (n. 3) ii 380.

¹⁷ Cf. F. Jacoby, *RE* viii 1542 f.; Schachermeyr (n. 14) 106 f.

¹⁸ Cf. R. Andreotti, *Saeculum* viii (1957) 134, arguing that Hieronymus may have had a pacifist ideology after his experience of the devastation wrought by the Successors (but cf. Schachermeyr [n. 14] 194 n. 188). If so, he may have placed a romantic interpretation upon Alexander's projected colonisation in order to preach a sermon to his own generation.

¹⁹ Cf. Badian (n. 14) 198 f., 203 f. Schachermeyr (n. 14)

193 f. places too much faith in the incorruptibility of Eumenes and takes it for granted that Hieronymus both had inside information and revealed nothing but the truth. Perdicas read the *hypomnemata*, but he acted on a group decision and, if there were forgeries, Eumenes would have been privy to them and acquiesced.

²⁰ Strabo i 4.9 (66).

²¹ Plut. *de Al. for.* i 6 (329a–c). The attribution to Eratosthenes began with E. Schwartz, *RhM* xl (1885) 252–4: briefly and dogmatically stated but subsequently accepted as dogma (cf. Tarn (n. 3) ii 437).

²² Badian (n. 4) 434–40; J. R. Hamilton, *Plutarch Alexander* (Oxford 1969) xxix–xxxiii. See now P. A. Brunt, *Athenaeum* lv (1977) 45–7.

²³ *de Al. for.* i 8 (330a) = *FGrH* 241 F 30.

reference to Eratosthenes seems thrown in as a passing remark, just as in chap. 3 he interlaces his exposition with casual references to Onesicritus, Aristobulus, Anaximenes and Duris. Eratosthenes, we may be sure, described Alexander's court dress, but we cannot assume that he gave it an ecumenical significance. What matters is Plutarch's mode of procedure. His task is to prove the thesis that Alexander was a philosopher in practice²⁴ and both the examples and their rhetorical embellishment are carefully geared to that end. His general view may derive ultimately from Onesicritus' story of Alexander and the gymnosophists,²⁵ but, if so, the original is totally transformed. Onesicritus' view is of an Alexander who still has sympathy for the search for wisdom even in the cares of empire; but for Plutarch Alexander not only sympathises with philosophical theories, he embodies and perfects them in his actions. In the same way the interpretation he gives to the Susa marriages and the assumption of court dress need owe nothing to previous writers. Once he had propounded his theme he was limited in his choice of material and his interpretation was predetermined. Other rhetoricians with other theses to prove would adapt their viewpoint accordingly. One need only compare Aelius Aristides' *Roman Oration*. Here Rome is exalted as Plutarch exalts Alexander. She is the civilising power, breaking down the old distinction of Hellene and barbarian by the conferment of citizenship upon all deserving men. Against that background Alexander can only be presented as a meteoric failure, who acquired empire but had no time to establish a permanent system of law, taxation and civil administration.²⁶ If Rome was the great reconciler, Alexander could only appear as an ephemeral conqueror. In these pieces of epideictic rhetoric it is the thesis adopted for debate which determines both the choice of material and the interpretation put upon it,²⁷ and it is a possibility, if no more, that the whole topic of racial fusion in Alexander's reign was a creation of the rhetorical schools of the early Empire. In Plutarch himself there is only one reference in the *Life of Alexander* (47.3) to Alexander's efforts to achieve *κοινωνία* and *ανάκρασις*, and the examples he chooses are different from those in the earlier speech—the creation of the *Epigoni* and the Marriage to Rhoxane. And there is virtually no reference to racial fusion outside Plutarch. Only Curtius places in Alexander's mouth a speech commemorating the Susa marriages as a device to remove all distinction between victor and vanquished.²⁸ This speech was allegedly delivered to the Iranian soldiers during the Opis mutiny, and once again the circumstances determine the content of the speech. The subject matter, as often in Curtius, may be derived from his immediate source; but the speech is composed in generalities with none of the interesting points of authentic detail found in other Curtian speeches, and it seems to me that the observations on the fusion of Macedonian and Iranian tradition are most likely to be embellishments by Curtius himself. Even so, it is interesting that the idea of fusion occurred to Curtius as a natural theme for a speech of Alexander during the Opis crisis. The *topos* of fusion existed in the early empire and there were regular *exempla*—court dress, dynastic marriages, and the assimilation of Iranians in the national army. Not surprisingly these are the areas in which modern discussion of the 'policy of fusion' has tended to centre—and there is the possibility that the rhetoricians of the early empire and modern scholarship are correct in their interpretation. But forensic eloquence is no substitute for analytic evaluation of the evidence, and the various *exempla* need to be assessed both in their historical detail and historical context.

We may begin with the assumption of Persian court ceremonial. This is most fully described

²⁴ The thesis to be proved is expounded at i 4 (328b), and it is regularly pointed by contrasts between philosophical principle and Alexander's actions in practice (328c–e, 329a–b, 330c).

²⁵ Strabo xv 1.64 (715) = *FGrH* 134 F 17; cf. Hamilton (n. 22) xxxi.

²⁶ For the characterisation of Alexander see Ael. Arist. xxvi (εις *Ρώμην*) 24–7. By contrast under Rome there is no distinction of Europe and Asia (60), *ἀλλὰ καθέστηκε κοινή τῆς γῆς δημοκρατία ὑφ' ἐνὶ τῷ ἀρίστῳ ἄρχοντι καὶ κοσμητῇ*, and there has developed a single harmonious union: *καὶ γέγονε μία ἄρμονία πολιτείας ἅπαντας συγκεκληκυία* (66).

²⁷ One may compare the orations of Dio of Prusa. In the first Alexander appears briefly as the type of an immoderate ruler, in the second he is the defender and emulator of an idealised Homeric kingship, and in the fourth he is presented as the youthful interlocutor of Diogenes, basically sound but in need of Cynic deflation. See A. Heuss, *Antike und Abendland* iv (1954) 92 f.

²⁸ Curt. x 3. 12–14: cf. 14, 'omnia eundem ducunt colorem. Nec Persis Macedonum morem adumbrare nec Macedonibus Persas imitari decorum. Eiusdem iuris esse debent qui sub eodem victuri sunt' (the continuation is lost in a lacuna).

by the vulgate sources,²⁹ especially Diodorus who mentions five aspects. Alexander introduced court chamberlains of Asiatic stock (*ράβδουχοὶ Ἀσιαγενεῖς*) and a bodyguard of distinguished nobles, including Darius' brother Oxyathres. Secondly he adopted some aspects of Persian court dress—the diadem, the white-striped tunic and the girdle.³⁰ Next he distributed scarlet robes and Persian harness to his companions, and finally took over Darius' harem of 360 concubines. Curtius has much the same detail but adds that Alexander used Darius' ring for his correspondence in Asia. The sources assess these moves variously. The vulgate sources unanimously regard them as a decline towards barbarian *τροπή*, as indeed does the normally uncritical Arrian (later he suggests on his own initiative that the adoption of mixed dress was a *σόφισμα* to win over the barbarians).³¹ Plutarch in his life represents the mixed dress as either an adaptation to native custom or an anticipation of the introduction of *proskynesis*. It is only in the *de Alexandri fortuna* that he represents it as a means to bring about friendship between victor and vanquished.³² There is no indication that any of the ancient sources had direct information about Alexander's motives for the innovation.

It should be emphasised that the adoption of Persian court protocol was fairly extensive, not confined to Alexander's choice of a mixed court dress. On the one hand he used Persians in ceremonial positions, but he also issued his *ἐταῖροι* with the traditional purple robes of the Achaemenid courtiers.³³ The new king had his *purpurati*, but they were Macedonians. As yet there was no attempt to integrate the two nobilities. Diodorus implies quite clearly that they formed separate groups. The Persians might be given posts as chamberlains and selected nobles formed into a corps of *δορυφόροι*, but Alexander showed clearly by his distribution of purple that the courtiers of the new Great King were his Macedonians.³⁴ In his dress and court ceremonial Alexander adopted Achaemenid practices but he kept Persians and Macedonians distinct and the Macedonians were in a privileged position.

The date of the innovation is also important. Plutarch states explicitly that Alexander first assumed mixed dress during the rest period in Parthia after the Hyrcanian expedition, that is, in autumn 330.³⁵ It is precisely at this point that the vulgate sources place the episode, and we cannot doubt the accuracy of the chronology.³⁶ Now Alexander's claims to be the legitimate king of the Persian empire go back at least to the Marathus correspondence of early 332, when he demanded that Darius acknowledge him as overlord. After Gaugamela he was solemnly pronounced King of Asia and furthered his claims by solemnly occupying the throne of Darius in Susa.³⁷ It is possible (though it cannot be proved) that Alexander was never formally consecrated in Pasargadae, and he seems never to have used the title 'King of Kings' in his dealings with the Greek world.³⁸ But his claims to be the legitimate king of the Persian empire were absolute. Yet,

²⁹ Diod. xvii 77.4–7; Curt. vi 6.1–10; Justin xii 3.8–12; Metz *Epitome* 1–2. Cf. Plut. *Al.* 45.1–4; Arr. iv 7.4–5. For full discussion see H.-H. Ritter, *Diadem und Königsherrschaft* (*Vestigia* vii: 1965) 31–55, superseding Berve (n. 5) 148–52.

³⁰ Arrian iv 7.4 (and the derivative *Itinerarium* 88) claim that Alexander adopted the upright tiara (*kitaris*) of the Persian king. Berve (n. 5) 148–50 therefore argued that Alexander alternated full Persian dress with a more conservative mixed costume, and scholars have been reluctant to reject Arrian's statement. But there is no corroboration (apart from the passing remark of Lucian, *Dial. Mort.* 14.4), and it conflicts with the explicit statements of the other sources. In fact Arrian's report of the Persian costume is a parenthesis, a further example of Alexander's barbarism tacked onto the punishment of Bessus, and Arrian may have added it from his own memory—in which case he could easily have made a slip (cf. iii 22.4 where he refers casually to the battle of 'Arbela' despite his fulminations at vi 11.4). Certainly his passing comment cannot stand against the rest of the tradition (so Ritter [n. 29] 47).

³¹ Arr. iv 7.4; cf. vii 29.4.

³² Plut. *Al.* 45.1; cf. *de Al. for.* i 8 (330a).

³³ The Achaemenid courtiers are regularly termed *φοινικισταὶ* or *purpurati*; cf. Xen. *Anab.* i 2.20; 5.7–8; Curt. iii 2.10; 8.15; 13.13 f. M. Reinhold, *Purple as a Status Symbol in Antiquity* (Coll. Latomus cxvi: 1970) 18–20.

³⁴ The lesson was underlined when Alexander selected as his chiliarch or Grand Vizier (Persian *hazarapatis*) his closest friend, Hephæstion: Berve, *Das Alexanderreich* (Munich 1926) ii 173 no. 357; Schachermeyr (n. 14) 31–7. The date of this appointment is not known, but it presumably followed his elevation to the command of the Companion cavalry in late 330 (Arr. iii 27.4), some time after Alexander first introduced Persian court ceremonial.

³⁵ Plut. *Al.* 45.1; cf. Diod. 77.4; Curt. vi 6.1, etc.

³⁶ Arrian places it in his narrative of 329/8, but the context is a timeless digression (above n. 30) and there is no basis for chronological arguments: cf. Ritter (n. 29) 47–9.

³⁷ Arr. ii 14.8–9; Curt. iv 1. 1–14; Plut. *Al.* 34.1 (cf. *FGrH* 532 F 1. C 38); Plut. *Al.* 37.7, 56.2; *de Al. for.* 329d; Diod. 66.3; Curt. v 2.13. Altheim (n. 3) 195–202 is totally unconvincing when he argues that Alexander had no pretensions to be king of Asia before the death of Darius.

³⁸ The arguments of Ritter (n. 29) 49 ff.

even so, Alexander did not adopt Achaemenid court protocol until at least six weeks after the death of Darius. What was the importance of the period in Parthia? The answer is that Alexander now had a rival. It was precisely at the time that he returned to Parthia that Alexander learned that Bessus had declared himself Darius' successor, assuming the jealously guarded royal prerogative, the *kitaris* or upright tiara, and also the regnal name Artaxerxes.³⁹ The news, according to Arrian, reached Alexander on his return to Parthia and the vulgate sources place Bessus' usurpation in the context of Alexander's new court protocol. Now the threat from Bessus should not be underestimated. He was related by blood to Darius⁴⁰ and could be seen by some as his legitimate successor. He also commanded the resources of Bactria and Sogdiana, whose cavalry had retired practically undefeated from the field of Gaugamela. It was also a period at which Alexander's military resources were at a low ebb. The Greek allied troops had been demobilised from Ecbatana, probably at the news of Darius' death.⁴¹ More seriously Alexander had left behind 6,000 of his phalanx troops at the Median border for the escort of his vast bullion train, and they were to remain detached from his main force until he entered Arachosia in early 329.⁴² He had also transferred his Thracian troops and a large body of mercenaries for the garrison of Media.⁴³ Alexander was caught with a greatly reduced army and he suffered for it. Satibarzanes, once a regicide and Alexander's first governor of Areia, immediately revolted and forced Alexander to return from his march on Bactria.⁴⁴ His intervention brought only temporary relief. No sooner had he moved south to Drangiana and Arachosia than Satibarzanes returned with reinforcements from Bessus, and his uprising was not crushed until the summer of 329.⁴⁵ At the same time Bessus' forces invaded Parthia and tried to establish a certain Brazanes as satrap.⁴⁶ The disaffection was widespread and it lasted almost a year. It was late 329 before Bessus was captured and the last rebels were brought from Parthia and Areia to meet the judgement of Alexander. There had been almost a year of challenge and insurrection, and it is difficult to believe that Alexander did not foresee trouble when he first heard of Bessus' usurpation.

The adoption of court protocol had an obvious propaganda value in these circumstances. Alexander demonstrated that he was genuinely King of Kings, not a mere foreign usurper, and the bodyguard of noble Persians was crucial to his claim. At his court in a position of high honour was none other than Oxyathres, brother of the late king. Not only was Alexander the self-proclaimed successor to Darius, but Darius' brother recognised the claim and supported Alexander's court ceremonial. This had been one of Alexander's assertions as early as 332, when he boasted that the Persians in his entourage followed him out of free choice.⁴⁷ At the same time Alexander adopted some items of Persian court dress, not the more obtrusive regalia (the tiara, and the purple trousers and long-sleeved *kandys*), but the diadem, the royal tunic and girdle, which he wore with the broad-brimmed Macedonian hat (*kausia*) and the Macedonian cloak.

³⁹ Arr. iii 25.3; cf. Curt. vi 6.12–13; *Metz Epit.* 3. For the royal monopoly of the upright tiara see *Ar. Birds* 487 with scholia; Xen. *Anab.* ii 5.23; Plut. *Artox.* 26.4 and, in general, Ritter (n. 29) 6 ff.

⁴⁰ Arr. iii 21.5, 30.4; cf. Diod. 74.1.

⁴¹ Arr. iii 19.5–6; Plut. *Al.* 42.5; Diod. 74.3–4; Curt. vi 2.17; Justin xii 1.1. Cf. Bosworth, *CQ* xxvi (1976) 132–6 for the chronology.

⁴² Arr. iii 19.7–8. For the reunification in Arachosia see Curt. vii 3.4. R. D. Milns, *GRBS* vii (1966) 165 n. 34 (so R. Lane Fox, *Alexander the Great* [London 1973] 532) has argued that the whole army was united in Parthia, but the argument rests on a misinterpretation of Arr. iii 25.4. The forces there said to be united are patently the several army columns used separately during the Elburz campaign (cf. iii 22.2, 24.1). It is clear that even the cavalry from the Median contingent only caught up when Alexander was on his way to Bactra (iii 25.3); the infantry must have followed at a considerable interval.

⁴³ Cf. Arr. iii 19.7. The mercenaries and Thracians commissioned to Parmenion were earmarked for the abortive Cadusian expedition, but they clearly remained as the garrison of Media. Parmenion's lieutenants and murderers are known to have held commands over mer-

cenary troops and Thracians: cf. Berve (n. 34) nos 8, 422, 508, 712.

⁴⁴ Arr. iii 25.5–7; Diod. 78.1–4; Curt. vi 6.20–34. The vulgate tradition is fuller and more credible than Arrian.

⁴⁵ Arr. iii 28.2–3; Diod. 81.3; Curt. vii 3.2 (renewed revolt when Alexander was in Ariaspian territory: Jan. 329); Diod. 83.4–6; Curt. vii 4.32 ff. (revolt crushed before Alexander reached Bactra: summer 329).

⁴⁶ Arr. iv 7.1: Brazanes and his fellow rebels were captured by Phrataphernes and conveyed to Bactra/Zariaspa during the winter of 329/8. At the same time Arsaces, Alexander's second satrap of Areia, was arrested for connivance in Satibarzanes' revolt: ἐθελοκακεῖν at iii 29.5 implies dereliction of duty (cf. iv 18.3; *Tact.* 12.11—the word is Herodotean) rather than actual rebellion (Berve [n. 34] nos 146, 179). There was trouble in the central satrapies apparently as late as 328/7, when Alexander felt it necessary to dismiss his satraps in Drangiana and Tapuria (Arr. iv. 18.3; Curt. viii 3.17; cf. x 1.39). The details and chronology of these dismissals are obscure, but the fact is certain.

⁴⁷ Arr. ii 14.7 (at this stage the only Persian noble known to have been with Alexander was Mithrines: Berve [n. 34] no. 524).

Even this caused serious discontent among the Macedonian army—and Macedonian resistance to things oriental is one of the persistent factors of Alexander's reign. All sources stress the hostility to Alexander's adoption of mixed dress and it is prominent in the list of grievances which led to the Opis mutiny in 324.⁴⁸ The cleft widened among Alexander's officers, and the disagreements between Craterus and Hephaestion were notorious; Craterus, we are told, steadfastly adhered to Macedonian tradition.⁴⁹ Now the popularity of Craterus is one of the best-attested facts of the period after Alexander's death. His short marriage to Phila made the lady a desirable bride for Demetrius.⁵⁰ So strong was the devotion of the phalangites that Eumenes in 321 went to extraordinary lengths to conceal the fact that Craterus led the opposing army, in the belief that no Macedonian would fight against him.⁵¹ The reason Plutarch gives (excerpting Hieronymus) is that Craterus often incurred Alexander's hatred by opposing his inclination to Persian excess and protecting ancestral customs from erosion.⁵² Now it is notable that in the latter years of Alexander's reign Craterus was sent repeatedly on lengthy missions away from court, almost assuming the mantle of Parmenion. In particular he led the army division of Macedonian veterans first from India to Carmania in 325/4 and then from Opis to the coast.⁵³ The veterans were the men most closely bound to him but his popularity was universal and the reason was his championship of ancestral custom. Macedonian kings were said to rule by custom rather than force (*οὐδὲ βία ἀλλὰ νόμῳ*)⁵⁴ and the sight of a Heraclid and Argead in the trappings of the Great King, the paradigm of despotism, must have been deeply shocking. All the more so since the march from Babylon, which had been a triumphal progress, marked by the sacking of Persepolis and the burning of the palace and finally the ignominious death of the last Achaemenid at the hands of his subjects. Now the victor was assuming the protocol of the vanquished, acting the part of Great King and declaring his intentions of remaining as lord of Asia—a matter of weeks after his troops had come near mutiny in their desire to end the campaign and return home.⁵⁵

The autumn of 330 was a time of crisis when Alexander was under strong and conflicting pressures. On the one hand the challenge from Bessus and his temporary shortage of troops forced him to propaganda, demonstrating to his subjects that he was not merely a foreign conqueror but the true Great King, supported by the old nobility of Darius. On the other he could not antagonise his Macedonians by too outrageous a breach of custom. The mixed dress was a compromise, taking on the very minimum of Persian attire compatible with his pretensions; and at the same time Alexander's Macedonian companions were given the purple robes of courtiers. This involved them in some of the odium of breach of custom and at the same time marked them out as the friends and satraps of the Great King. It was a limited experiment, and Diodorus is probably right that Alexander used the new ceremonial fairly sparingly.⁵⁶ We hear little of it in the years after 330. The Persian ushers figure among Cleitus' complaints at Maracanda, but only in Plutarch's version and then only as a peripheral attack.⁵⁷ The complaints re-emerge in Curtius' speeches on the occasion of the Pages' Conspiracy (327). They are raised briefly by Hermolaus and answered by Alexander.⁵⁸ The material may come from Curtius' sources, as do several details in these speeches, but the formulation is vague and consistent with the limited experiment implied

⁴⁸ Diod. 77.7; Curt. vi 6.9–12; Justin xii 4.1; cf. Arr. vii 6.2, 8.2.

⁴⁹ Cf. Plut. *Al.* 47.7–12; *de Al. for.* ii 4 (337a).

⁵⁰ Plut. *Demetr.* 14.2: *διὰ τὸ προσυνωκηκέναι Κρατέρῳ τῷ πλείστην εὐνοίαν αὐτοῦ παρὰ Μακεδόσι τῶν Ἀλεξάνδρου διαδόχων ἀπολιπόντι.*

⁵¹ Cf. Plut. *Eum.* 6–7; Nepos *Eum.* 3.4–5; Arr. *Succ.* F 1.27 (Roos) (cf. F 19=Suda s.v. *Κράτερος*, contrasting Craterus' popularity with the unpopularity of Antipater).

⁵² Plut. *Eum.* 6.3. This explicit statement has been queried (cf. Berve [n. 34] ii 226; Hamilton [n. 22] 131), mainly on the strength of Alexander's farewell at Opis (*τὸν πιστότατον τε αὐτῷ καὶ ὄντινα ἴσον τῇ ἑαυτοῦ κεφαλῇ ἄγει*). But the king had given an equally moving (and permanent) farewell to Coenus shortly after his determined opposition at the Hyphasis (Arr. vi 2.1; Curt. ix 3.20; cf. Badian, *JHS* lxxxix [1961] 25), and in the case of Craterus the public statement of confidence and friendship does not exclude there having been bitter wrangles in

private. Curtius describes Craterus as *regi carus in paucis* (vi 8.2), but the comment comes in the context of Philotas' trial, before there can have been concerted opposition to Alexander's Medism.

⁵³ See the detailed exposition of Berve (n. 34) ii 222–4 (no. 446).

⁵⁴ Cf. Arr. iv 11.6: the context is Callisthenes' speech against *proskynesis*, which presumably owes much to Arrian's own shaping, but the sentiment is convincing enough.

⁵⁵ Curt. vi 2.15 ff.; Diod. 74.3; Justin xii 3.2–4. The episode is omitted by Arrian, probably because his sources were reluctant to stress the discontent in the army.

⁵⁶ Diod. 77.7: *τούτοις μὲν οὖν τοῖς ἔθισμοῖς Ἀλέξανδρος σπανίως ἐχρήτη, τοῖς δὲ προὔπαρχοις κατὰ τὸ πλείστον ἐνδιέτριβε.*

⁵⁷ Plut. *Al.* 51.2; cf. 71.3.

⁵⁸ Curt. viii 7.12: *Persarum te vestis et disciplina delectat: patrios mores exosus es.* Cf. viii 8.10–13.

by Diodorus. Polyaeus also indicates that Alexander reserved his Persian ceremonial for receptions of his barbarian subjects during the campaigns in Bactria, Hyrcania and India,⁵⁹ but, as we shall see, his information is garbled to some extent and mostly refers to the last years of the reign. Nothing, however, contradicts the pattern of the evidence, which suggests that Alexander's first introduction of Persian ceremonial was a limited gesture, designed to capture the allegiance of his barbarian subjects at a time of crisis.

The court ceremonial was far more obtrusive after the return from India in 325/4. Alexander's mixed court dress figured prominently in the complaints made by his Macedonian troops before the Opis mutiny, and, far from confining it to his appearances before barbarian subjects, he now wore it every day, the Macedonian cloak with the Persian white-striped tunic and the Macedonian *kausia* with the Persian diadem. The source admittedly is Ehippus of Olynthus, who was markedly hostile to Alexander, but there is no reason to doubt what he says.⁶⁰ In any case it is not the day-to-day costume of the king that he is out to pillory but the outrageous charades that he staged at banquets, dressing as Ammon, Hermes, Heracles and even Artemis. Ehippus' evidence moreover fits in well with what is otherwise known of the extravagance of Alexander's court during his last year. There is a famous description, deriving from the third century author, Phylarchus, which deals with the day-to-day splendour of Alexander's court. Three versions survive (in Athenaeus, Aelian and Polyaeus) and they are complementary.⁶¹ All these sources indicate that the court scene described was regular in Alexander's later days, but it is clear that the description refers primarily to the five-day period of the Susa marriages. The vast tent with its 100 couches and 50 golden pillars corresponds to the description of the Susa marriage hall provided by Alexander's chamberlain, Chares of Mytilene,⁶² and it is hard to see how such a mammoth structure could have accompanied Alexander on all his travels. Similarly Polyaeus refers to a group of 500 dignitaries from Susa who formed a group outside the tent⁶³ and there is no reason why such a group should have been present when the court was not at Susa. The description, then, refers to a limited period, but the arrangements described are interesting. The court was arranged in concentric circles around Alexander and his *σωματοφύλακες*, that is, the eight supreme marshals of the Macedonian nobility. The first circle comprised 500 Macedonian *argyraspides*, selected for their physique; next came 1,000 archers in multi-coloured costumes, and on the outer circle of the tent 500 Persian *melophoroi*, the old infantry guard of the Achaemenid court with the distinctive golden apples on their spear butts. Alexander now had two royal guards, one the traditional Macedonian *agema* of hypaspists (the equation with *argyraspides* is certain)⁶⁴ and the other the traditional Achaemenid guard, but the two forces were kept distinct—the Macedonians closest to the king and the Persians separated by a girdle of archers. The division was continued outside the tent where the *agema* of elephants was stationed together with 1,000 Macedonians in Macedonian dress and in the final outer circle 10,000 Persians in Persian costume and scimitars. This was a brilliant display of Persian and Macedonian ceremonial, but the two races were kept rigidly separated. There was no attempt at integration—nor even of '*Gleichstellung*', for the Macedonians were invariably closer to the king. Again we have no reason to doubt the main details of this description. The arrangement with its concentric circles was clearly imitated in

⁵⁹ Polyaeus. iv 3.24.

⁶⁰ *FGrH* 126 F 5 (Athen. xii 537c–f). His description of the mixed dress coheres with the other evidence, particularly that of Eratosthenes (nn. 23, 29), and Aristobulus seems to confirm that Alexander wore the *kausia* with the diadem as his day-to-day dress (Arr. vii 22.2 = *FGrH* 139 F 55). Cf. Ritter (n. 29) 57–8, accepting the material from Ehippus despite his misgivings about the value of the source.

⁶¹ Athen. xii 539d = *FGrH* 81 F 41; Ael. *VH* ix 3; Polyaeus. iv 3.24.

⁶² *FGrH* 125 F 4: 100 couches and 20 cubit pillars covered with gold and silver leaf.

⁶³ ἐπὶ τοῦτοις πεντακόσιοι Σούσιοι πορφυροσχήμενοι. This group of 500 is also mentioned by Athenaeus, but Polyaeus alone says that they came from Susa.

⁶⁴ Cf. Diod. 57.2; Curt. iv 13.27 with Arr. iii 11.9. According to Justin xii 7.5 the name originated in 327

when Alexander began his march into India and had his men's shields silvered for the occasion—and Harpalus allegedly sent 25,000 items of equipment chased with silver and gold (Curt. ix 3.21). The *argyraspides* also appear in the list of units named at the Opis mutiny in the place of the hypaspists (Arr. vii 11.3). This evidence cannot be dismissed as fantasy and anachronism (pace R. D. Lock, *Historia* xxvi [1977] 373–8). After the Indian campaign the hypaspists could also be known as *argyraspides*. The fact that the famous corps of Teutamus and Antigonus is called solely *argyraspides*, never hypaspists, is easy to explain. After Alexander's death the Successors set up their own bodyguards of hypaspists (Polyaeus. iv 6.8; Diod. xix 28.1; Polyaeus. iv 9.3) and hypaspist was no longer an exclusive title. Accordingly the veterans of Alexander used their second title *argyraspides* to distinguish themselves from the hypaspists of the other generals, who had not served under Alexander.

Peucestas' great state banquet at Persepolis in 317 B.C., only here it was the closeness to Philip and Alexander which was emphasised by the division and at the centre Persian dignitaries occupied couches alongside Macedonians.⁶⁵

Some degree of integration had taken place by the end of the reign. After the great mutiny of 324 Alexander introduced 1,000 Persians into the court guard of hypaspists. Both Diodorus and Justin agree on the fact but differ over whether it came after or during the mutiny.⁶⁶ Either it was part of Alexander's moves to bring his Macedonians to heel or it was a consequence of the mutiny, a permanent reminder of his threat to recruit his guard from Persians alone. But even so there is no evidence that the two races were intermingled in the guard and some that they were not. The panels on Alexander's sarcophagus portrayed the elaborate progress of the king in the last part of his life. Alexander rode in a chariot, preceded by an advance guard and surrounded by his regular court guard. This guard was divided into two separate bodies, one Macedonian armed in Macedonian style and the other Persian *melophoroi*.⁶⁷ Now the two races stood side by side, but they were brigaded in separate and identifiable corps. There was no attempt to integrate them into a unified body; if anything, it looks like deliberate design to balance one against the other.

It is clear that Alexander's court had become much more pretentious in the last two years of his life. The mixed dress was a more permanent feature and there was an increasing use of Persian *melophoroi* as court guards. The pomp and circumstance fits well the increasing megalomania of Alexander's last years which, as is well known, rose to a climax after the death of Hephaestion.⁶⁸ The increase in Persian ceremonial was doubtless caused by the fact that in 325/4 Alexander was travelling consistently between the old Achaemenid capitals (Persepolis, Susa, Ecbatana and Babylon) and needed to display himself to his oriental subjects as the new Great King. What is more, his absence in India between 327 and 325 had brought renewed insubordination and insurrection. The satraps of Carmania, Susiana and Paraetacene were executed when Alexander returned to the west and replaced by Macedonians.⁶⁹ More seriously, when he reached Persia proper he discovered that Orxines, apparently a lineal descendant of Cyrus the Great who had commanded the Persian contingent at Gaugamela, had established himself as satrap without any authorisation by Alexander.⁷⁰ There had also been trouble in the inner satrapies, for Craterus needed to arrest an insurgent, Ordanes, during his progress through southern Iran; and in Media a certain Baryaxes had assumed the upright tiara and laid claim to the throne of the Medes and Persians.⁷¹ Alexander must have felt that there was widespread reluctance among his Iranian subjects to accept his regal authority,⁷² and his parade of all the magnificence of the Achaemenid court including the old bodyguard of *melophoroi* is perfectly understandable. But while Alexander increased the Persian complement in his immediate entourage he appears to have reduced their political influence away from court. The end of the reign saw only three Iranians governing satrapies—Alexander's own father-in-law in distant Parapamisadae, the impeccably loyal Phrathernes in Parthia/Hyrcania, and Atropates in Media, the satrapy with the most formidable garrison of Hellenic troops. There are many aspects to Alexander's behaviour. We may plausibly argue a desire to flaunt ostentatiously the splendour of his court, to impress his Iranian subjects with his military power and legitimacy as Great King; and there are signs that he used his promotion of Iranians to crush discontent among his Macedonian army. What we cannot as yet

⁶⁵ Diod. xix 22.2.

⁶⁶ Diod. 110.1 f. (after the mutiny); Justin xii 12.4 (during). Both sources conflate the expansion of the guard with the formation of a mixed phalanx, which only occurred in mid 323 (below, p. 18). The common source (Cleitarachus) may well have given a summary of Alexander's various experiments with mixed infantry forces and tacked them onto the report of the great mutiny. Arr. vii 29.4 speaks in the most general terms of the admixture of *μηλοφόροι* into the Macedonian ranks, corroborating the fact but giving no indication of chronology.

⁶⁷ Diod. xviii 27.1: *περὶ τὸν βασιλέα μία μὲν ὑπῆρχε θεραπεία καθωπλισμένη Μακεδόνων, ἄλλη δὲ Περσῶν μηλοφόρων.*

⁶⁸ Cf. J. R. Hamilton, *CQ* iii (1953) 156 f.; Schachermeyr (n. 3) 514 f.

⁶⁹ Curt. ix 10.21, 29 (Carmania); Arr. vii 4.1; Plut. *Al.* 68.7 (Susiana/Paraetacene). See further Badian (n. 52) 17; Bosworth, *CQ* xxi (1971) 124; Schachermeyr (n. 3) 477 f.

⁷⁰ Arr. vi 30.1–2; Curt. x 1.24 ff. For Orxines' lineage see Curt. iv 12.8. Curtius states that he had the overall command of the Persians at Gaugamela; Arrian (iii 8.5) gives him the command of the forces of the Red Sea, but there is almost certainly a lacuna in his text—all reference to the Persian national contingent is omitted.

⁷¹ Arr. vi 27.3; 29.3. Curtius ix 10.19 mentions two rebels, Ozines and Zariaspes, who were arrested by Craterus; the former at least seems identical with Arrian's Ordanes: Droysen (n. 2) i² 2.199 n. 1; but cf. Berve (n. 34) no. 579.

⁷² Plut. *Al.* 68.3: *καὶ ὅλως διέδραμε σάλος ἀπάντων καὶ νεωτερισμός*; cf. Curt. x 1.7.

assume is any serious policy of assimilating and fusing the two races. The reverse seems the case.

We must now turn to the theme of mixed marriage, which was the original inspiration for Droysen's idea of '*Verschmelzungspolitik*'. For almost the first ten years of his reign Alexander avoided marriage with remarkable success.⁷³ After Issus the majority of the Persian royal ladies were in his power. Alexander scrupulously cultivated the Queen Mother, Sisygambis as his 'Mother' and promised dowries to Darius' daughters.⁷⁴ Taking over Darius' functions as son and father he buttressed his claims to be the genuine King of Asia. But he stopped short of actual marriage, contenting himself with a liaison with Barsine, the daughter of Artabazus and descendant of Artaxerxes II. This liaison was protracted and from it came a son, Heracles, born in 327,⁷⁵ but there was no question of marriage until the last days of Alexander's campaign in Bactria/Sogdiana. Then came his meeting with Rhoxane and almost immediate marriage. The circumstances whereby Rhoxane came into his hands cannot be elucidated here, for they involve one of the most intractable clashes of authority between Arrian and the vulgate tradition,⁷⁶ but fortunately there is unanimity about the date of the wedding (spring 327) and equal unanimity that it was a love match. There is, however, no suggestion of a policy of fusion. Curtius merely accredits him with a statement that it was conducive to the stability of the empire that Persians and Macedonians were joined in marriage; the arrogance of the victors and shame of the vanquished would both be reduced.⁷⁷ This is a far cry from the symbolic union of races which many have seen in the marriage.

There is, however, a point to be stressed. Alexander married Rhoxane whereas he had only formed a liaison with Barsine. If all that was at issue was physical attraction, there was no reason for a formal marriage, unless we believe that Alexander's chivalry had improved since Issus. There were undoubtedly political reasons as well. Rhoxane married Alexander in spring 327 on the eve of his march into India. The previous two years had seen unremitting warfare caused by repeated insurrections inside Bactria/Sogdiana and invasions from the Saka nomads of the steppes. Alexander's response had been increasingly savage repression. During the first stage of the uprising, summer 329, his orders included the massacre of all male defenders of conquered cities and the enslavement of women and children.⁷⁸ Later we hear a dark story of the crucifixion of defenders who actually capitulated⁷⁹ and the index of Diodorus hints at wholesale massacre.⁸⁰ At the same time Alexander founded a network of military settlements with a nucleus of Greek mercenaries and discharged Macedonian veterans together with settlers from the barbarian hinterland.⁸¹ The relationship between Greek and barbarian is hard to elicit in this instance, but both Curtius and Justin suggest that the barbarians involved in the foundation of Alexandria Eschate were survivors from the recently conquered cities, especially Cyropolis.⁸² In that case

⁷³ Note the wrangle with Antipater and Parmenion in 335 (Diod. 16.2); the story is circumstantial and there is no reason to doubt it.

⁷⁴ Diod. 37.6; Curt. iii 12.24 f.; cf. Diod. 38.1; 67.1; Curt. v 2.18 ff.; Arr. ii 12.5.

⁷⁵ Plut. *Al.* 21.7; *Eum.* 1.7; Diod. xx 20.1; 28.1; Justin xi 10.2 f.; xii 15.9; Tarn's attempt to disprove the existence of the captive Barsine and her son Heracles (ii 330-7) is now a mere historical curiosity; cf. Schachermeyr (n. 14) 22 n. 32a; P. A. Brunt, *RFIC* ciii (1975) 22-34; R. M. Errington, *JHS* xc (1970) 74.

⁷⁶ Arrian iv 18.4 says that the family of Oxyartes was captured on the rock of Sogdiana in spring 327. Curtius says nothing about Oxyartes and his family in the context of the Sogdian rock, whose capture he dates to spring 328 (vii 11.1). Rhoxane first appears in a banquet given by 'Cohortandus' in spring 327 (viii 4.21-30). That is the order of events in the index of Diodorus (the narrative proper is lost) and the *Metz Epitome* (15-18, 28-31). Strabo xi 11.4 (517) claims that Alexander met Rhoxane not on the rock of Sogdiana but on the rock of Sismithres,

the next to be captured. The source conflict is obstinate and can only be settled by careful analysis of all sources in context, with particular emphasis on chronology. Fortunately all sources place the actual marriage immediately before the march on India.

⁷⁷ Curt. viii 4.25; cf. Plut. *Al.* 47.7 with Hamilton (n. 22) 129 f.

⁷⁸ Arr. iv 2.4: οὕτως ἐξ Ἀλεξάνδρου προσεταγμένον; 3.1; Curt. vii 6.16.

⁷⁹ Curt. vii 11.28 (*Metz Epit.* 18 has a variant); the story is omitted by Arrian but not contradicted (cf. iv 19.4).

⁸⁰ Diod. xvii index κγ' (p. 3 Budé; 110 Loeb): ὡς Ἀλέξανδρος ἀποστάντας τοὺς Σογδιανοὺς κατεπολέμησε καὶ κατέσφαξεν αὐτῶν πλείους τῶν δώδεκα μυριάδων.

⁸¹ Cf. Arr. iv 4.1. At Alexandria in Caucaso there were 7,000 locals to 3,000 Hellenic troops (Diod. 83.2; Curt. vii 3.23). There is no indication that the number of settlers or the racial proportion was consistent throughout Alexander's foundations.

⁸² Curt. vii 6.27; Justin xii 5.12 f. Cf. P. Briant, *Klio* lx (1978) 74-7.

they can hardly have acted in any other role than that of native serfs.⁸³ Curtius adds that the survivors from the rock of Sogdiana were distributed to the colonists of the new foundations, as additional slaves.⁸⁴ Some of the barbarians may have participated as volunteers on a more privileged basis, but the Greek settlers certainly formed a governing élite and their numbers were such that they could keep their barbarian subjects under military control. Outside the colonies the principal fortresses were occupied by Greco-Macedonian garrisons⁸⁵ and both colonies and fortresses had commandants directly imposed by Alexander. Finally the satrapy of Bactria/Sogdiana was in the overall control of a Macedonian, Amyntas son of Nicolaus.⁸⁶ In no other satrapy of the east was Macedonian military strength so firmly entrenched in the permanent establishment. Though there remained small pockets of independence such as the districts of Sisimithres and Chorienes,⁸⁷ Hellenic military settlements dominated the bulk of the countryside and the hierarchy was exclusively Greco-Macedonian.

The marriage to Roxane marks the final act of the settlement, and Curtius may be justified in viewing it as an act of conciliation after two years of warfare and devastation. But there is another aspect. The taking of a bride from the Iranian nobility of Bactria underlined Alexander's claims to be the legitimate lord of the area. In 336 he had had a painful object lesson in his wooing of the daughter of Pixodarus of Caria, and the result of that episode had been the demonstration that with the princess went the satrapy.⁸⁸ He himself had taken care to venerate the elderly Hecatomnid princess Ada as 'Mother' to support his claims to Caria.⁸⁹ It was natural that after demonstrating his military supremacy to the Bactrians and Sogdians he married one of their princesses, cementing his rule by the wedding. There is a tradition moreover that Alexander also persuaded some of his friends to marry Bactrian ladies.⁹⁰ If it is true (and there is no contrary evidence), his fellow bridegrooms may well have been the satrap and garrison commanders left behind after the march on India. The new lords of the region would now have native wives.

Finally we come to the palladium of Alexander's alleged policy of fusion—the mass marriage at Susa at which Alexander and 91 of his Companions took Iranian brides. The weddings were celebrated with the utmost splendour in the Iranian mode⁹¹ and Alexander commemorated the event by distributing gifts to Macedonian soldiers who had taken native wives, to the number of 10,000.⁹² Without doubt this was a ceremony of unparalleled pomp with important political implications, but the sources leave us totally uninformed of those implications. In the speech *de Alexandri fortuna* Plutarch represents the marriage as a means of uniting the two imperial peoples, as does Curtius in the speech he attributes to Alexander;⁹³ but, as we have seen, both statements reflect the rhetorical interpretations of the first century A.D. rather than any authentic tradition from the time of Alexander. But if we look at the recorded facts, one feature stands out starkly—so starkly that it is incredible that it was first noted by Hampl in 1954.⁹⁴ The marriages were totally one-sided. Persian wives were given to Macedonian husbands, but there is no instance of the reverse relationship. Admittedly Alexander's court was not well endowed with noble ladies of Greek or Macedonian extraction, but, if his aim was really to place the two

⁸³ So Berve (n. 34) i 299. The excavations at Ai Khanoum are illustrating with ever increasing fullness the stubbornly Hellenic nature of that foundation. Cf. Seibert (n. 3) for bibliography, to which add Sir M. Wheeler, *Flames over Persepolis* (London 1968) 75 ff. and the successive reports by P. Bernard in *CRAI* 1974–6. Note particularly the new discoveries relating to the theatre and theatrical performances: *CRAI* 1976, 307–22.

⁸⁴ Curt. vii 11.29: *multitudo deditorum incolis novarum urbium cum pecunia capta dono data est.*

⁸⁵ Arr. iii 29.1 (Aornus); *Metz Epit.* 7–8; Arr. iv 5.2 (Maracanda), 16.4–5; Curt. viii 1.3 (Attinas, phrurarch of an unknown fortress).

⁸⁶ Berve (n. 34) no. 60. He was appointed satrap either in winter 328/7 (Arr. iv 17.3) or in summer 328 (Curt. viii 2.14).

⁸⁷ For Sisimithres see Curt. viii 2.32; 4.20; *Metz Epit.* 19; for Chorienes *Metz Epit.* 28; Curt. viii 4.21 (Alde's emendation Oxyartes for 'Cohortandus' is unacceptable). Arrian (iv 21.9) conflates the two figures.

⁸⁸ For the story of Pixodarus see Plut. *Al.* 10.1–5; cf. Badian *Phoenix* xvii (1963) 244 ff. with Hamilton (n. 22) 24 ff. For the outcome of the episode see Arr. i 23.8; Strabo xiv 2.17 (657).

⁸⁹ Plut. *Al.* 22.7; Arr i 23.8. For the eastern tradition of descent through the female line see H. Gelzer, *RhM* xxxv (1880) 515–17.

⁹⁰ *Metz Epit.* 31; Diod. xvii index λ: τῶν φίλων πολλοὺς ἐπέισε γῆμαι.

⁹¹ Arr. vii 4.6 (cf. Plut. *Al.* 70.3; *de Al. for.* 7 [329d–e]; Diod. 107.6; Justin xii 10.10; Chares *FGrH* 125 F 4). The Persian ritual was what irked the Macedonian rank and file (vii 6.2); the marriage to Roxane had been celebrated in Macedonian mode according to Curtius (vii 4.27), and there is no reason to dispute his statement (cf. M. Renard and J. Servais, *Ant. Class.* xxiv [1955] 29–50).

⁹² Arr. vii 4.8; Plut. *Al.* 70.3. See further p. 18 below.

⁹³ Plut. 329e: *κοινωνίαν συνιοῦσι τοῖς μεγίστοις καὶ δυνατωτάτοις γένεσι*; cf. Curt. x 3.11–14.

⁹⁴ Cf. Hampl (n. 7) 119.

imperial races on an equal footing, it would have been relatively easy for him to import the necessary brides from mainland Greece and delay the ceremony until they arrived. In fact there is nothing attested except Persian women married to Greco-Macedonian men.⁹⁵ The names as recorded are striking. Alexander and Hephæstion both married daughters of Darius, Craterus a daughter of Darius' brother, Oxyathres. The other wives whose names are recorded came from prominent satrapal families—daughters of Artabazus, Atropates of Media, and even Spitamenes, the leader of the insurgent Sogdians during 329 and 328.⁹⁶ This was an integration of sorts, but its effect was to mark out Alexander's Companions as the new rulers of the Persian Empire. They already had the scarlet robes of Persian courtiers; now they were married into the most prominent satrapal families. Nothing could have made it clearer that Alexander intended his Macedonians to rule with him as the new lords of the conquered empire.

It is also debatable how far Alexander intended his Macedonians to be assimilated into Persian ways. The traditional view is that Alexander wished the Macedonian nobles to adapt themselves to Persian customs but was frustrated by the Macedonians' tenacious adherence to their ancestral tradition. This theory rests primarily upon Arrian's account of Peucestas' installation as satrap of Persis in early 324. As soon as he was appointed he affected Median dress and became the only Macedonian to do so and learn the Persian language. Alexander commended him for his actions and he became popular with his Persian subjects, correspondingly unpopular with the mutinous Macedonian rank-and-file.⁹⁷ Peucestas' adoption of Persian customs is an unchallengeable fact, but it remains to be seen whether his behaviour was unique. In the first place he was not the only person in Alexander's entourage to learn an oriental language. We are told explicitly that Laomedon of Mytilene (brother of Erigyus) was a bilingual, or at least could understand semitic script, and Eumenes could concoct a letter in Aramaic, the *lingua franca* of the eastern world.⁹⁸ If Arrian's credit be retained, we must assume either that Peucestas was the only foreigner to learn Persian (as opposed to Aramaic) or that he excluded the Greeks and referred only to true Macedonians. But Diodorus gives another perspective when he explains Peucestas' popularity with his subjects in 317 B.C. Alexander, so it was said, made a concession. Only Peucestas was *allowed* to wear Persian dress, so that the favour of the Persians could be secured.⁹⁹ If we accept the text as it stands (and nothing in Arrian contradicts it) we must conclude that as a general rule Macedonian nobles were not permitted to assume the full Persian dress.¹⁰⁰ The satrap of Persis was the one exception. Doubtless Alexander had laid to heart the lesson of Orxines' usurpation and concluded that in Persis his satrap had to conform and be seen to conform to the local *mores*. And in the case of Peucestas there was no reason to suspect his personal loyalty; he had saved the king in the Malli town and owed his promotion to Alexander's favour.¹⁰¹ He could therefore be encouraged to adapt himself to Persian tradition and ingratiate himself with his subjects. In other satrapies Alexander might have felt it prudent to drive a wedge between the satraps and their subjects. The rulers were marked out by their dress as aliens and were accordingly most unlikely to develop the accord with their subjects which they would need to revolt from the central authority. The evidence of Diodorus suggests that Peucestas was not meant to be a paradigm for other governors but rather an exception to the general rule.

It is difficult to trace any admission of Persian nobles into the Macedonian court hierarchy. Before 324 the only certain example is Oxyathres, brother of Darius, who was admitted to the

⁹⁵ Artabazus (Berve [n. 34] no. 152) had married a sister of Mentor and Memnon of Rhodes but that marriage had taken place by 362: Dem. xxiii 154, 157; cf. Brunt, *RFIC* ciii (1975) 25.

⁹⁶ Arr. vii 4.5–7. For the role of Spitamenes see iii 28.10, 29.6; iv 3.6 ff.; 17.7. Full references in Berve (n. 34) ii 359–61 (no. 717).

⁹⁷ Arr. vi 30.2 f.; vii 6.3, 23.3.

⁹⁸ Arr. iii 6.6 (Laomedon); Diod. xix 23.1–3; Polyæn. iv 8.3 (Eumenes). Note, however, the use of an Iranian interpreter in Sogdiana (Arr. iv 3.7).

⁹⁹ Diod. xix 14.5: *φασὶ καὶ τὸν Ἀλέξανδρον αὐτῷ μόνῳ Μακεδόνων συγχωρῆσαι Περσικὴν φορεῖν στολήν, χαρίζεσθαι βουλόμενον τοῖς Πέρσασιν καὶ διὰ τοῦτου νομίζοντα κατὰ πάνθ' ἕξειν τὸ ἔθνος ὑπήκοον.*

¹⁰⁰ Arrian states that one of Peucestas' qualifications to govern Persis was his general sympathy with the barbarian life-style (*τῷ βαρβαρικῷ τρόπῳ τῆς διαίτης*: vi 30.2). This does not imply that he had already adopted Persian dress. Leonnatus, for instance, is said to have attached himself to the lifestyle of the conquered peoples in Alexander's lifetime; he only assumed items of Persian dress after the king's death: Suda s.v. *Λεόννατος* = Arr. *Succ.* F 12 (Roos).

¹⁰¹ Peucestas was trierarch with his brother in 326 (Arr. *Ind.* 19.8), but at the Malli town he is merely styled 'one of the hypaspists' (Diod. 99.4; but cf. Arr. vi 9.3). He seems to have held no position of command before his elevation to the Bodyguard in Carmania (Arr. vi 28.3). See further Berve (n. 34) no. 634.

ranks of the *ἑταῖροι* immediately after his brother's death.¹⁰² It is hazardous to argue from silence, given the defective nature of all Alexander histories, but there is some evidence that Persians were initially excluded from the court hierarchy. In 329 Pharnuches, apparently an Iranian domiciled in Lycia,¹⁰³ found himself in titular command of a force of mercenaries thanks to his competence in the local dialects. When his force was ambushed, he attempted (so Aristobulus claimed) to cede his command to Macedonian officers on the grounds that he was a barbarian while they were Macedonians and *ἑταῖροι* of the King. The account in general is confused and tendentious, but the clear distinction between barbarians and *ἑταῖροι* is fundamental to it.¹⁰⁴ Admittedly the text does not state that there were no barbarian *ἑταῖροι*, but it does support the argument from silence. Nearchus' list of trierarchs for the Indus fleet takes us further. The Macedonians of Alexander's court are listed according to their domicile, as are the Greeks. There are two representatives of the regal families of Cyprus, and finally one solitary Persian—Bagoas, son of Pharnuches.¹⁰⁵ The rarity of the patronymic virtually guarantees that Bagoas was the son of the Lycian Pharnuches. Unlike his father, he achieved a status commensurate with the Macedonian *ἑταῖροι*, and he was probably the Bagoas who entertained Alexander at Babylon.¹⁰⁶ But at the time of the Indus voyage he was the only Persian among the *ἑταῖροι* (Oxyathres had retired to Ecbatana to supervise Bessus' execution); otherwise it is inconceivable that his fellow Iranians did not compete as trierarchs.

By 324 there were more Iranians among the *ἑταῖροι*. Arrian gives the names of nine nobles who were drafted into the élite cavalry *agema*, the king's guard. The list is intended to be exhaustive, and what makes the first impression is its brevity.¹⁰⁷ Not only is the list short but the families are well known—a group selected by Alexander for especial distinction. There is a son of Artabazus, two sons of Mazaeus, two of Phrataphernes and finally Itanes, brother of Alexander's wife Rhoxane.¹⁰⁸ The fathers were all satraps and their loyalty was impeccable throughout the reign. Two names, Mithrobaeus and Aegobares, are totally unknown,¹⁰⁹ but the leader of the group, Hystaspes of Bactria, was connected by marriage to the house of Artaxerxes III Ochus, and he may have been a descendant of the son of Xerxes who ruled Bactria in the fifth century.¹¹⁰ The lineage of these nobles was beyond reproach and, given their small numbers, one may assume that Alexander was forming an élite within the Persian nobility. One can only guess at his motives, but there were two clear results from his actions. The small group of nobles incorporated in the *agema* were effectively isolated from their father's satrapies. They were trained and armed in Macedonian style and doubtless identified with the conquerors by their people. At the same time they acted as hostages for their parents, as did the Macedonian pages around Alexander's person.¹¹¹ These adlections to the *agema* seem a parallel phenomenon to Alexander's satrapal appointments. The Iranian satraps were reduced to a handful—Phrataphernes, Oxyartes and Atropates—and their sons were attached to Alexander's own court, separated by distance and culture from their roots in the satrapies.

¹⁰² Plut. *Al.* 43.7; Curt. vi 2.11. He remained at court for a little over a year, returning to Ecbatana to supervise the execution of Bessus (Diod. 83.9; Curt. vii 5.40; Justin xii 5.11).

¹⁰³ Arr. iv 3.7. For the persistence of Iranian families in southern Asia Minor throughout the Hellenistic and Roman periods see L. Robert, *Opera Minora Selecta* iii (Amsterdam 1969) 1532 ff.; CRAI 1975, 326–30. For the specifically Lycian evidence see E. Benveniste, *Titres et noms propres en iranien ancien* (Paris 1966) 101–3.

¹⁰⁴ Arr. iv 6.1 = FGrH 139 F 27. For the general bias of this account see L. Pearson, *The Lost Histories of Alexander the Great* (1960) 167 f. Curtius vii 6.24, 7.34 ff. says nothing about Pharnuches and makes Menedemus sole commander (so Metz *Epit.* 13).

¹⁰⁵ Arr. *Ind.* 18.8 = FGrH 133 F 1a.

¹⁰⁶ Ael. *VH* iii 23 = FGrH 117 F 2a. Berve (n. 34) no. 195 and Badian, *CQ* viii (1958) 156, prefer to identify this Bagoas as the notorious eunuch.

¹⁰⁷ Arr. vii 6.4–5. For the textual problems (not relevant here) see the *Appendix*, p. 20.

¹⁰⁸ Some had already given service to Alexander: Cophes had negotiated the surrender of Ariomazes (Curt. vii 11.22 ff.), Phradasmenes had brought succour to the army in Carmania (Arr. vi 27.3) and Artiboles had played a role in the pursuit of Darius (iii 21.1; but cf. Curt. v 13.11; Berve (n. 34) nos. 82, 154).

¹⁰⁹ There is a possibility that they are the sons of Atropates, the third Iranian satrap surviving in 324 (Berve (n. 34) no. 124); his two colleagues, Phrataphernes and Oxyartes, had supplied sons for the *agema*, and he had visited Alexander at Pasargadae, shortly after the arrival of Phradasmenes and Phrataphernes (Arr. vi 29.3; cf. 27.3).

¹¹⁰ Cf. Curt. vi 2.7, adding that Hystaspes was both a relative of Darius and a military commander under him. For the fifth-century Hystaspes see Diod. xi 69.2. Given his Bactrian connexions and his relationship to Darius there is some chance that he was a relative of Bessus!

¹¹¹ Arr. iv 13.1; Curt. viii 6.2–6; cf. Berve (n. 34) i 37–9.

The evidence so far has produced little or nothing that suggests any policy of fusion. Alexander's actions when viewed in their historical context seem rather to indicate a policy of division. There was no attempt to intermix the Macedonian and Persian nobilities, if anything an attempt to keep them apart. In particular the Macedonians seem to have been cast as the ruling race. It is they who monopolise the principal commands, civil and military, they who marry the women of the Persian aristocracy, they who dominate court life. Even when Alexander adopted Persian ceremonial his Macedonians were marked out as his courtiers and his chiliarch (or grand vizier) was no Persian but his bosom friend Hephaestion. By contrast apart from a small, carefully chosen élite the Persians had no positions of power at court and the Iranian satraps were inexorably reduced in numbers as the reign progressed. The factor which dominated everything was Alexander's concept of personal autocracy. From early 332 to the end of his life he declared himself King of Asia. He acknowledged no equal and all were his subjects. Against that background the traditional recalcitrance of the Iranian satraps was totally unacceptable and, I believe, Alexander's actions can largely be explained as a demonstration of the fact of conquest. His court ceremonial underlined that he alone was the Great King and the mass marriages made it patently obvious that he and his nobles were the inheritors of the Achaemenids. As for the Persians, they were gradually extracted from the satrapies in which they had been prematurely confirmed in the years after Gaugamela and only a small group was left, tied by marriage to the Macedonian conquerors and with sons virtual hostages at court. This is a far cry from any policy of fusion. The only counter evidence comes from the Opis mutiny, when Alexander turned to his Iranians in order to crush disaffection among the Macedonians. Afterwards Alexander was able to pray for community of command, but the prayer was demonstrably affected by the recent events. In effect there is no hint that Alexander gave positions of power to Iranians during his last year; the hierarchy of command remained stubbornly Macedonian.

If there is no trace of any planned integration of the Macedonian and Persian aristocracies, it might be thought that the fusion took place at a lower level. By the end of his reign Alexander certainly possessed a mixed army, in which Persians and Macedonians fought side by side both in the phalanx and Companion cavalry. But did the mixture come about by policy or by military necessity? And how rigorous was the fusion? Were the two races divided into separate sub-units or did they fight side by side in integrated companies and with common weaponry? These questions are fundamental and once again require close examination of the evidence.

According to orthodox dogma Alexander began to use oriental cavalry at an early stage. In his description of the Hyrcanian campaign (late summer 330) Arrian notes that the king now had a body of mounted javelin-men (*ἵππακοντισταί*).¹¹² These troops were used repeatedly in the campaigns in central Iran and Bactria, and it is universally assumed that they were a select Iranian squadron, recruited to give extra flexibility to his cavalry.¹¹³ But there is no hint in any of the ten references in Arrian that these troops were Iranians. In fact they are invariably grouped with regular units of the Macedonian army, the Agrianians, and the Companions. What is more, *ἵππακοντισταί* formed the nucleus of the garrison of Areia in 330 and they were massacred during Satibarzanes' first revolt.¹¹⁴ It is surprising that Iranians were chosen for such an exposed position, more surprising that they remained loyal. One should certainly admit the possibility that these troops were Macedonians. Now one of Alexander's principal cavalry units, the Scouts (*πρόδρομοι*), is not mentioned after the pursuit of Darius. Instead the *ἵππακοντισταί* appear precisely in the role formerly cast for the Scouts,¹¹⁵ and in Sogdiana they are used alongside *σαρισσοφόροι*, who previously belonged to the Scouts.¹¹⁶ It is possible that Alexander reorganised the Scouts in the year after Gaugamela and turned them into two formations, one using the ponderous *sarisa* and the other light missile javelins.¹¹⁷ At Gaugamela the Scouts had been mauled by the cavalry of the eastern satrapies, and Alexander perhaps thought it prudent to

¹¹² Arr. iii 24.1; cf. 25.2–5, 29.7; iv 4.7, 23.1, 25.6, 26.4, 29.7; vi 17.4.

¹¹³ Berve (n. 34) i 151; Brunt, *JHS* lxxxiii (1963) 42; Griffith, *JHS* lxxxiii (1963) 69 f.

¹¹⁴ Arr. iii 25.2, 5. The remaining *ἵππακοντισταί* were used on Alexander's punitive expedition (25.6).

¹¹⁵ Compare Arr. iii 25.6 with 20.1.

¹¹⁶ Arr. iv 4.6–7. Cf. Brunt (n. 113) 27 f.; R. D. Milns, *JHS* lxxxvi (1966) 167; M. M. Markle, *AJA* lxxxi (1977) 337.

¹¹⁷ It is possible that even before 330 the *σαρισσοφόροι* used their special weapon only in pitched battle (Arr. i 14.1; Curt. iv 15.13); it would have been an unnecessary encumbrance: cf. Markle (n. 116) 334–6.

variegate his cavalry before moving east. The year 330 was one of reorganisation, the year that hipparchies are first mentioned in Ptolemy's campaign narrative,¹¹⁸ and it is perfectly credible that Alexander trained some of his Scouts as a unit of javelin-men.¹¹⁹ There is no reason to assume that he was using an Iranian squadron in conjunction with his Macedonian troops as early as 330.

The first unequivocal reference to use of oriental troops comes in the Sogdian revolt of 328/7, when we are told that Bactrians and Sogdians fought in the satrapal forces of Amyntas.¹²⁰ When he left Bactria for India Alexander had with him large numbers of Iranian cavalry, from Bactria, Sogdiana, Arachosia and Parapamisadae. There were also Saka cavalry from the northern steppes.¹²¹ These troops fought alongside the Macedonians at the Hydaspes but they were brigaded in separate formations and outside the battle narrative they are not individually mentioned. There is one exception, the squadron of horse-archers (*ἵπποτόξοι*) which first emerges during the march on India and is mentioned repeatedly in Arrian's campaign narrative.¹²² The horse-archers are usually employed alongside Macedonian units in relatively light formations, performing the same functions, it seems, as did formerly the Scouts and *ἵππακοντισταί* (who are mentioned once only after the invasion of India). These horse-archers seem to have been recruited from the Dahae, who are specifically designated the horse-archers at the Hydaspes,¹²³ and it looks as though they formed a *corps d'élite* corresponding to the Agrianians in the infantry. The first appearance of these Iranian troops is significant. After the protracted campaign in Bactria/Sogdiana Alexander was leaving the area altogether and moving to invade India. The Iranian cavalry were being employed outside their home territory where there was little chance of disaffection. Alexander could safely draw upon them to strengthen his own cavalry, and at the same time they served as a great pool of hostages, exactly as had the troops of the Corinthian League during the first years of the campaign. They fought in national units and there was as yet no attempt to combine them with his Macedonian troops.

The combination took place, in the cavalry at least, after Alexander's return to the west in 325. The only evidence unfortunately is a single passage of Arrian which is at best unclear and most probably corrupt. In his list of Macedonian grievances at Susa Arrian gives superficially detailed information about the use of barbarians in the cavalry (vii 6.2–5); this he summarises two chapters later as an admixture of heterogeneous cavalry into the ranks of the barbarians.¹²⁴ What kind of admixture is meant? Arrian divides the Macedonians' grievance into three parts. In the first place he mentions that certain Iranians, selected for their social distinction and physique, were assigned to the Companion cavalry. There were three categories, carefully marked off: first Bactrians, Sogdians and Arachosians; next Drangians, Areians and Parthyaean; and finally an obscure group of Persians termed the 'Euacae'. As Brunt saw, these groups correspond to the cavalry taken from Bactria in 327, the troops which arrived in Carmania in late 325, and finally cavalry levied in Persis in early 324.¹²⁵ The incorporation of the last two groups was a relatively recent occurrence, but it is possible that the Bactrian cavalry had been integrated with the Companions as early as the campaign in Southern India. The verb Arrian used to describe the incorporation (*καταλοχισθέντες*) is unfortunately flexible. In its technical sense it denotes the division of an

¹¹⁸ Arr. iii 29.7. The date and nature of the reorganisation is disputed (cf. Brunt (n. 113) 28–30; Griffith (n. 113) 70–73) and the subject badly needs a thorough investigation. But the year 330 was undoubtedly a time of military innovation: cf. iii 16.11 (cavalry *lochoi*), iii 18.5 (a mysterious and unique cavalry *tetrarchia*).

¹¹⁹ The javelin was a traditional weapon of the Macedonian cavalry, illustrated on the coinage of Alexander I (cf. Markle (n. 116) 337 n. 59); the Companions may have fought with a javelin as well as their thrusting lance (Diod. 60.2; Arr. i 2–6; but cf. i 15.6).

¹²⁰ Arr. iv 17.3; cf. Griffith (n. 113) 69.

¹²¹ Arr. v 11.3 (cavalry from Arachosia and Parapamisadae serving alongside Craterus' hipparchy); v 12.2 (Bactrians, Sogdians and Saka, including Dahian horse archers).

¹²² Arr. iv 24.1, 28.8; v 14.3, 15.1, 16.4, 18.3, 20.3, 22.5; vi 5.5, 6.1, 21.3, 22.1.

¹²³ Arr. v 12.2 *καὶ Δάας τοὺς ἵπποτόξοις*. They were apparently 1,000 strong (v 16.4); see further Altheim (n. 3) 210 f.

¹²⁴ vii 8.2: *ἀνάμιξις τῶν ἀλλοφύλων ἐς τὰς τῶν ἐταίρων τάξεις*. Griffith (n. 113) 68, 72 f., made absurdly heavy weather of this passage and denied that Arrian is summarising his previous exposition. Instead he argues that Arrian refers to a reorganisation during the Indian campaign, in which Orientals were added to the hipparchies; see the convincing rebuttal of Badian, *JHS* lxxxv (1965) 160.

¹²⁵ Brunt (n. 113) 43. For the arrival of Drangians, Areians and Parthyaean see Arr. vi 27.3. The Euacae are only known from Arrian, but they may be a picked unit, the cavalry equivalent of the *Kardakes* of the infantry (Arr. ii 8.6; Nepos *Dat.* 8.2; Hsch. s.v.; Tarn (n. 3) ii 180–2 should be discounted).

amorphous body of troops into distinctive files or *λόχοι*,¹²⁶ but it is most often used in the most general sense as a synonym of *καταλέγειν*. What it does not mean is assignment of extra troops to existing units.¹²⁷ Arrian makes the situation clearer in his next phrase. Besides these Iranians assigned (*καταλοχισθέντες*) to the Companion cavalry there was a fifth hipparchy which was not entirely barbarian. The phrase implies clearly that there were four hipparchies consisting wholly of Iranian cavalry¹²⁸ and a fifth which was only partially so. It must be emphasised that the passage says nothing about the number of Macedonian hipparchies at this period (although it has frequently been taken to do so).¹²⁹ What is at issue is the reaction of the Macedonians to Persian involvement in the Companion cavalry, and their grievances are presented in ascending order. First comes the objection that the Iranians were organised in separate hipparchies within the cavalry body, next the more serious complaint that there was a mixed hipparchy, in which Iranians and Macedonians served together and finally the crowning outrage that there was a troop of Persian nobles inside the élite *agema*. The organisation of the Macedonians was irrelevant to the grievances, and we must assume that there was an unspecified number of Macedonian hipparchies *in addition to* the four Persian hipparchies and the mixed hipparchy.¹³⁰ The total number at this period cannot even be guessed at.

Arrian says virtually nothing about the process of infiltration. He merely adds an obscure parenthesis remarking that the fifth mixed hipparchy had originated at a time when the entire cavalry body was expanded. The date of the expansion is not given, but it is a reasonable (and popular) assumption that it came after the crossing of the Gedrosian desert, which certainly caused great loss of life and greater loss of livestock, especially horses.¹³¹ Probably Alexander reformed his cavalry during his stay in Persis, regrouping the Macedonians and adding the recent arrivals from central Iran. The supernumeraries, both Macedonian and Iranian, were grouped together in a single hipparchy, the only unit apart from the *agema* in which the two races were combined. The basic reorganisation, then, seems to have occurred in 325/4, but there is a possibility that the Bactrians and Sogdians had served inside the Companion cavalry before this date. We have noted that they fought at the Hydaspes in separate national units and it is a striking fact that they are never again mentioned in the campaign narrative for Southern India. Once more it is possible that the omission is purely fortuitous, but there is nothing against the hypothesis that some of the Iranian cavalry had been brigaded in hipparchies as early as 326.

If the evidence of Arrian is strictly interpreted, it indicates that, apart from one hipparchy, Macedonians and Iranians served in separate units within the body of the Companion cavalry. In other words, the Iranian cavalry shared the title of *ἑταῖροι*. This has often been doubted, but Arrian's terminology seems unambiguous: they were assigned to the Companion cavalry. Alexander's actions at Opis are not contrary evidence. There he began to create new formations of Persians bearing the Macedonian names, including a fresh cavalry *agema καὶ ἡ τῶν ἑταίρων ἵππος*.¹³² This does not imply that all Companions had previously been Macedonians, rather that in future he intended to have a corps of Companions who were exclusively Persian. That is quite compatible with a situation before the mutiny in which Macedonians and Iranians served together in a single body of Companions. And the single reference in Arrian to Macedonian Companions does not exclude there having been Persian Companions also.¹³³ A curious picture

¹²⁶ So Arr. *Tact.* 5.2-4: *πλήθος ἀνθρώπων ἀθρόον καὶ ἄτακτον ἐς τάξιν καὶ κόσμον καταστήσαι—τὸ δ' ἔστιν καταλοχίσαι τε καὶ ξυλλοχίσαι*. Compare Arr. vii 24.1 where he describes the division of Peucestas' Persians into phalanx files; at vii 23.3 he uses *καταλέγειν* as a synonym (cf. Diod. xviii 70.1).

¹²⁷ So Griffith (n. 113) 72: his second interpretation 'one *λόχος* of each *ile* now became a *λόχος* of picked Iranians' is not impossible, but again it reads too much into the wording. The word anticipates *κατελέγησαν* and *προσκαταλεγέντες* immediately below and, as at vii 24.1, it is used as a conscious variant in the most general sense.

¹²⁸ I do not understand how Brunt (n. 113) 44 can say that it 'might mean that it was more or less Oriental than the other four'.

¹²⁹ E.g. Berve (n. 34) i 111 f.; Tarn (n. 3) ii 164 f.; Brunt

(n. 113) 43 f.; Griffith (n. 113) 72-4.

¹³⁰ There were eight hipparchies in addition to the *agema* between 328 and 326 (cf. Arr. iv 24.1 with 22.7, 23.1; vi 6.4 with 7.2 and 6.1; Brunt [n. 113] 29 has miscalculated by one). There must have been serious losses in Gedrosia but we have no basis for speculation.

¹³¹ For the casualties see H. Strasburger, *Hermes* lxxx (1952) 486 f. (15,000 survivors out of 60,000/70,000). For the livestock see Arr. vi 25.1: *τῶν ἵππων τοὺς πολλοὺς ἀποσφάζοντες*.

¹³² Arr. vii 11.3; cf. Griffith (n. 113) 72: 'this must imply that hitherto its members have been all Macedonians'.

¹³³ Arr. vi 17.3; vi 14.4 does not explicitly exclude Iranians.

therefore emerges. The Iranian cavalry largely served in separate hipparchies, and they retained their national weapons (it is only the group of nobles in the *agema* who are said to have exchanged their javelins for Macedonian lances). Nevertheless they served in the Companion cavalry and presumably bore the title *ἑταῖροι*. It would seem that Alexander was using the traditional policy of Macedonian kings. The title *pezhetairoi* (Foot Companions), as a name for the entire phalanx infantry, appears to have been introduced as a deliberate measure to place the infantry on terms of equality with the cavalry.¹³⁴ The King named all his infantry his Companions and emphasised their close ties to him, thus setting them up as a group parallel and opposed to the aristocratic cavalry, the group which had previously monopolised the title of Companion. Alexander, it seems, did the same with his cavalry, establishing a body of Iranian Companions in the same organisation as the Macedonians. This development fits well into the period after the Hyphasis mutiny, when Alexander was faced with disaffection or, at best, lack of enthusiasm among his own troops. The admission of Iranian Companions made it clear that he was not limited to his Macedonians and could find support elsewhere. It was an implicit threat, which was nearly fulfilled at Opis. There is, then, no trace of a policy of fusion. Once again the tendency seems to have been to keep Iranians and Macedonians separate and even mutually suspicious. Each served as a check and balance on the other.

The pattern is further exemplified in Alexander's use of Iranian infantry. First and foremost is the formation of 30,000 *Epigoni*, Iranian youths armed in Macedonian fashion and trained in phalanx discipline. All sources agree that the *Epigoni* arrived during Alexander's stay in Susa and aroused the jealousy and fear of the Macedonians by their brilliant display.¹³⁵ Plutarch alone says that the institution was designed to promote a mixture (*ἀνάκρασις*) and harmony;¹³⁶ the vulgate sources see much more sinister motives. For Diodorus the formation was Alexander's reaction to the recalcitrance of his Macedonian troops ever since the Hyphasis mutiny (he speaks of the Ganges!). The king needed an *ἀντίταγμα* for his Macedonian phalanx. Pierre Briant has recently elucidated the sense of *ἀντίταγμα*; it was a counter-army, 'face à une phalange macédonienne et contre elle'.¹³⁷ Elsewhere Diodorus uses the word to describe the force of mercenaries raised by Thrasybulus of Syracuse to counter his citizen forces and Plutarch describes as an *ἀντίταγμα* the force of cavalry which Eumenes in 322/1 built up to counter and crush the phalanx infantry of Neoptolemus.¹³⁸ When applied to Alexander's *Epigoni* the word has a sinister ring. Alexander intended the Persians not only to balance his Macedonian forces but also to be thrown against them if necessary.

Curtius describes the origins of this new counter-infantry, claiming that Alexander gave orders for the levy of 30,000 youths before he left Bactria in 327, intending them to be conveyed to him when trained, to act as hostages as well as soldiers.¹³⁹ His order is presented as a security measure—a measure against the Iranians not the Macedonians. Some of this coheres with other evidence. Arrian claims that the *Epigoni* were raised by satraps from the newly-founded cities and the rest of the conquered territories.¹⁴⁰ His terminology is loose, using *σατράπης* to refer to the city commandants whom he elsewhere terms *ὑπαρχοι*,¹⁴¹ but it is clear that the new foundations

¹³⁴ Anaximenes *FGrH* 72 F 4; on which see most recently P. A. Brunt, *JHS* xcvi (1976) 150–3; R. D. Milns in *Entr. Hardt* xxii (1976) 89 ff.

¹³⁵ Arr. vii 6.1; Diod. 108.1–3; Plut. *Al.* 71.1.

¹³⁶ Plut. *Al.* 47.6.

¹³⁷ P. Briant, *REA* lxxiv (1972) 51–60, esp. 55—an excellent summary, but slightly misleading in that Briant (57) seems to think that Alexander actually conferred the title *pezhetairoi* upon his Iranian infantry at Opis. Arrian suggests that Alexander made a threat only; there is no hint that he fully carried it out.

¹³⁸ Diod. xi 67.5 (*cf.* Plut. *Cleom.* 23.1); Plut. *Eum.* 4.2–3; *pace* Briant (n. 137) 58 it does not appear that Eumenes created an *ἀντίταγμα* against his own troops. After the victory against Ariarathes Neoptolemus was left to continue operations in Armenia with a large nucleus of Macedonian troops (Briant, *Antigone le Borgne* [Paris 1973] 152 n. 8). According to Plutarch Perdicas had his

suspensions of Neoptolemus' loyalty and commissioned Eumenes to control him—hence the need for the Iranian cavalry to be used against Neoptolemus' phalanx (*Eum.* 4.3, *cf.* 5.4). There is no indication that Eumenes had Macedonians of his own in any numbers (*cf.* Diod. xviii 29.5).

¹³⁹ Curt. viii 5.1: *obsides simul habiturus et milites*. Justin xii 4.11 dates the formation of the *Epigoni* to the same period but conflates them with the soldiers' children who were also trained in Macedonian style (*cf.* Arr. vii 12.2).

¹⁴⁰ vii 6.1: οἱ σατράπαι οἱ ἐκ τῶν πόλεων τῶν νεοκτίστων καὶ τῆς ἄλλης γῆς τῆς δοριαλάτου. At v 20.7 Sisicottus, previously named phrurarch of Aornus (iv 30.4), is termed satrap. For the interchangeability of the terms satrap and hyparch see Bosworth, *CQ* xxiv (1974) 55–7.

¹⁴¹ E.g. iv 22.4.

of the east were the prime recruiting grounds for the *Epigoni*. These foundations were concentrated most densely in Bactria/Sogdiana and, as we have seen, the conquered peoples formed a large pool of second-class citizens. They were an obvious area for recruits; young men were closely concentrated and it would be a prudential step to remove those who were outstanding and most likely to be discontented with their lot. Originally, then, Alexander's intention might have been to skim away the most outstanding youths of the central satrapies, train them in effective infantry tactics and then isolate them from their cultural background. As the morale and obedience of his Macedonians declined he saw the potential of his new infantry phalanx and deliberately used the new force to balance and intimidate his Macedonians. It was essential that the two infantry bodies were kept distinct—an obvious and permanent exception to any policy of fusion.

According to Justin there was a second body of *Epigoni*, the offspring of mixed marriages between Macedonian soldiers and Asiatic wives. Justin states that Alexander began to encourage these unions in 330, at the time when he first adopted Persian dress. Two motives are given—to reduce his troops' longing for domestic life in Macedonia and to create an army of mixed race whose only home was the camp.¹⁴² Justin is fuller than usual and not apparently garbled; and there is corroborative evidence. Arrian agrees that more than 10,000 mixed marriages had been contracted by the time of the celebrations at Susa and the veterans of Opis had produced a fair number of offspring by their native wives, enough for Alexander to retain them, promising to train them in Macedonian style and to reunite them with their fathers when they reached manhood.¹⁴³ The evidence is consistent and indicates that Alexander had long- and short-term objectives. In the first place the legitimisation of his troops' liaisons with native women gave them an inducement to remain in Asia which was stronger than mere concubinage and politically desirable in 330, when there was agitation in the army to conclude the campaign and return to Macedonia.¹⁴⁴ The ultimate aim, however, was to produce a corps of troops without roots in Europe or permanent home in Asia, the janissaries of the new Empire, whose loyalty would be to Alexander alone.¹⁴⁵ The two bodies of *Epigoni* were alike in their close attachment to the court and their training in Macedonian discipline. In both cases Alexander was attempting to create a supra-national army, but his motives were grounded in practical politics and military considerations were paramount.

So far the evidence has indicated that Alexander kept Iranians and Macedonians separated in both cavalry and infantry and that he used the two races to counterbalance each other. There is, however, one instance of a combined force of Persians and Macedonians. Shortly before Alexander's death Peucestas arrived in Babylon with a force of 20,000 Persians, reinforced with mountaineers from the Zagros and Elburz.¹⁴⁶ The king commended this new force and assigned them to the Macedonian ranks (*κατέλεγεν ἐς τὰς Μακεδονικὰς τάξεις*). The details of this reorganisation are given, for once, and they are interesting. This new composite infantry was organised into files (*δεκάδες*) of sixteen, twelve Persians to four Macedonians. Each file was commanded by a Macedonian, backed by two other Macedonians in second and third place. The Persians then filled out the centre of the phalanx and a Macedonian brought up the rear. The four Macedonians were armed in traditional style (with the *sarisa*) and were given preferential rates of pay, whereas the Persians retained their native bows and javelins. The result was a curiously heterogeneous phalanx, packed with Persians untrained in Macedonian discipline. The Macedonians formed an élite, the first three ranks using *sarisae* and bearing the brunt of any attack. Even in the old phalanx there was hardly space for more than the first three ranks to use *sarisae* in couched position. In Polybius' day, when *sarisae* were longer, only the first five ranks were able to thrust with their weapons; the rest added weight and held their *sarisae* vertically as a screen against missiles.¹⁴⁷ The Persians in the new phalanx added weight and numbers and no doubt they were intended to shoot arrows and javelins over the heads of the Macedonian ranks, much in the same

¹⁴² Justin xii 4.2–10: Berve (n. 5) 157–9 valiantly attempts to prove that the women of these marriages were predominantly Iranian.

¹⁴³ Arr. vii 4.8 (cf. Plut. *Al.* 70.3); vii 12.2.

¹⁴⁴ Diod. xvii 74.3; Curt. vi 2.15–4.1; Justin xii 3.2–4; Plut. *Al.* 47.1–2.

¹⁴⁵ Cf. Badian (n. 7) 201: 'his purpose, ultimately, was

the creation of a royal army with no fixed blood or domicile—children of the camp who knew no loyalty but to him'.

¹⁴⁶ Arr. vii 23.1–4; cf. Diod. 110.2 (wrongly assigned to Susa 324).

¹⁴⁷ Plb. xviii 30.1–4; cf. Arr. *Tact.* 12.10.

way as the *λογχοφόροι* were to operate in Arrian's legionary phalanx of A.D. 135.¹⁴⁸ This new phalanx could only be used in frontal attack. There was no possibility of complex manoeuvres or changes of front and depth on the march, which had been the hallmark of the old Macedonian phalanx and had been displayed so prominently in the Illyrian campaign of 335 and the approach to Issus.¹⁴⁹ This reorganisation was in fact a means to make the best use of untrained manpower and also to husband the trained Macedonian phalangites. It is strong *prima facie* evidence that Alexander's native Macedonian troops were in short supply by 323.

There is every reason to believe that the main army was drained of Macedonians. Curtius (x 2.8) implies that Alexander was thinking of leaving a moderate holding army in Asia after the departure of Craterus' veterans, an army comprising 13,000 infantry and 2,000 cavalry. These are superficially high figures, but none the less misleading. There is no reason to think that only Macedonians are understood.¹⁵⁰ The explicit context is the size of the force to be left in Asia (he had recently threatened to attack Athens and the Arabian expedition was in preparation);¹⁵¹ it is specifically a holding force and presumably contained a relatively small proportion of Macedonians.¹⁵² After Opis Alexander deliberately drained his infantry forces, sending with Craterus 6,000 of the veterans present at the Hellespont in 334 and 4,000 of the troops conveyed in later reinforcements.¹⁵³ There is no statement how many remained, but one may assume that the fighting in India and the Gedrosian desert march took a heavy toll of life, and there is little trace of reinforcements. Only Curtius speaks of 8,000 *Graeci* sent to Sogdiana in 329/8 and 5,000 cavalry (*sic*) sent from Thrace in 326.¹⁵⁴ There is no trace in the sources of Macedonian reinforcements and it seems that Antipater did not have the necessary manpower resources to cater for Alexander's demands. Diodorus says explicitly that Macedonia was drained of national troops in 323 because of the numbers of reinforcements sent to Asia, so that he could not cope with the initial crisis of the Lamian War.¹⁵⁵ The forces who remained in Babylon can only be guessed at. The *argyraspides*, 3,000 in number, were present in Perdiccas' invasion force in 321, and, since their baggage train contained their wives and children, we can assume that they were not sent with Craterus' column in 324.¹⁵⁶ Alexander must have retained them in Babylon together with an unspecified number of phalangites.¹⁵⁷ They were also veterans for the most part. The evidence for the *argyraspides* is unanimous that they had all fought through the campaigns of Philip and Alexander. The statement that the youngest of the corps were sixty years old may be an exaggeration, but it is common to Diodorus and Plutarch and presumably derives from Hieronymus.¹⁵⁸ And we should not forget the exploits of Antigonos at Ipsus and Lysimachus and Seleucus at Corupedium: *in hac aetate utriusque animi iuvenes erant*.¹⁵⁹ It seems then that Alexander

¹⁴⁸ Arr. *Ect. c. Alanos* 15–17, 26 f. For full discussion see Bosworth, *HSCP* lxxxii (1977) 238–47.

¹⁴⁹ Arr. i 6.1–3; ii 8.2 (*cf.* Plb. xii 19.5 f.; Curt. iii 9.12).

¹⁵⁰ So Brunt (n. 113) 38; Griffith, *G&R* xii (1965) 130–1 n. 4. Berve (n. 34) i 134, was more cautious (Curtius gives a total of Macedonians and Greeks without giving their relative proportions).

¹⁵¹ *Cf.* Curt. x 2.2; Justin xiii 5.7 (Athens). For the Arabian expedition see Schachermeyr (n. 3) 538–46.

¹⁵² Even so the possibility of being chosen led to panic (Curt. x 2.12).

¹⁵³ Diod. xviii 16.4. The figure 10,000 is standard; Arr. vii 12.1; Diod. xvii 109.1; *cf.* Justin xii 12.7 (11,000, presumably including the 1,500 cavalry).

¹⁵⁴ Curt. vii 10.11 f.; ix 3.21. Alexander had sent a recruiting expedition from Sogdiana in winter 328/7 (Arr. iv 18.3) but there were no results before 323, when the cavalry with Menidas at Babylon may have come from Macedonia (vii 23.1; *cf.* Berve [n. 34] no. 258, Badian [n. 52] 22 n. 39). Justin also suggests that the shortage of Macedonians was becoming apparent by 327 (xii 4.5).

¹⁵⁵ Diod. xviii 12.2. *Pace* Griffith (n. 150) 130 f., the forces of Antipater in 323 cannot be estimated from Diodorus' figures, for *Μακεδόνες* at 12.2 patently means 'the forces on the Macedonian side', doubtless including

Illyrians and Thracians as well as mercenaries: *cf.* M. Launey, *Recherches sur les armées hellénistiques* (Paris 1949) 292 f. We should remember that Antipater was in similar difficulties at the time of Agis' War yet was able to raise a force of 40,000: Diod. 63.1; *cf.* Phoenix xxix (1975) 35–8. Similarly we have no idea how many of the 20,000 foot raised by Leonnatus (Diod. xviii 14.4–5) were native Macedonians. The only thing certain is that the forces with Craterus in 321 were 20,000 in number and 'mostly Macedonians' (Diod. xviii 30.4; *cf.* 24.1), but, once again, the nucleus must have been the veterans he had brought from Opis.

¹⁵⁶ For their presence with Perdiccas see Arr. *Succ. F* 1.35 (Roos) and for their famous *ἀποσκέυη* see Diod. xix 43.7; Plut. *Eum.* 16; Justin xiv 3.3 ff.

¹⁵⁷ Peithon in 323 had 3,000 infantry and 800 cavalry selected by lot from the Macedonians (Diod. xviii 7.3) and Neoptolemus had an unspecified number of Macedonians in Armenia (above, n. 138); but we have no criteria for calculating the total. Berve's estimate of 4,000–5,000 (i 185) is the merest guess (see also Schachermeyr [n. 14] 14 f. 5,000–6,000 phalangites and hypaspists).

¹⁵⁸ Diod. xix 30.6, 41.1–2; Plut. *Eum.* 16.7–8.

¹⁵⁹ Justin xvii 2.10 f.; for Antigonos see Hieronymus, *FGrH* 154 F 10.

was left with a nucleus of Macedonian veterans. He had ordered Antipater to bring prime troops from Macedonia to replace Craterus' army column but they could not be expected for some time after Craterus reached Macedon—and he was travelling with prudent slowness.¹⁶⁰ But Alexander was about to embark on the Arabian expedition, and shortly before his death the advance orders for the departure of both land and naval forces had been given.¹⁶¹ There was no alternative but to make the best of his Macedonian veterans—to distribute them among the front-rank positions and fill up the phalanx in depth with Persian infantry. The mixture was patently forced upon Alexander by military necessity. Had the fresh levies from Macedon ever arrived, he would certainly have removed the Iranian rank and file and replaced them with the trained manpower from Macedon.¹⁶²

Nothing remains of the policy of fusion. As regards his military organisation Alexander was reacting to a series of problems. To begin with, his use of Iranians from the central satrapies was determined by his need for auxiliaries in the Indian campaign and the obvious desirability of removing crack fighting men from their native satrapies, where they would be fuel for any revolt against his regal authority. The next stage was to use his Iranian auxiliaries as a counter-weight to his increasingly mutinous Macedonian troops, and finally, when the Macedonians were decimated and cowed, they were used as a pool of manpower to supplement the trained Macedonian cadres. There is nothing here remotely resembling a deliberate policy to fuse together the two peoples into a single army. If there is any policy it is *divide et impera*. We have seen Alexander at work at two levels. Firstly the continuous and traditional recalcitrance of his Iranian nobles forced him to proclaim his pretensions as the heir of the Achaemenids with increasing pomp and splendour and to make it increasingly obvious that his Greco-Macedonian nobles had in fact supplanted the Iranians as a ruling class. On the other hand the increasing disaffection of his Macedonian rank and file forced him to rely more on Iranian infantry and cavalry. If there is any consistent element it is Alexander's categorical claim to personal autocracy and the reciprocal demand for total obedience from his subjects at all levels of society. The resistance to that claim appeared in different forms and Alexander's response was accordingly different. There is little that can be said to approximate to careful premeditated policy; rather Alexander seems to have reacted promptly to the various challenges confronting him during his reign. The result is piecemeal and certainly less romantic than a visionary policy of fusion and conciliation but it is far truer to the evidence as it stands.

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APPENDIX: ARRIAN VII 6.4

καὶ πέμπτη ἐπὶ τούτοις ἵππαρχία προσγενομένη, οὐ βαρβαρική ἢ πᾶσα, ἀλλὰ ἐπαυξηθέντος γὰρ τοῦ παντὸς ἵππικοῦ κατελέγησαν ἐς αὐτὸ τῶν βαρβάρων.

'... and a fifth hipparchy added in addition to these, not entirely barbarian (but partially), for when the entire cavalry was expanded some barbarians were assigned to it.'

The difficulty is in the parenthesis. It purports to explain the existence of the fifth hipparchy but instead talks of the entire cavalry. The fact that some barbarians were assigned to the cavalry is a mere summary of the preceding phrases not an explanation of the formation of the fifth mixed hipparchy. There have been two recent attempts at emendation:

(i) Brunt, *JHS* lxxxiii (1963) 44, deletes the following phrase (τῷ τε ἀγέματι προσκαταλεγέντες) as a gloss and emends ἐς αὐτὸ τὸ ἐς αὐτήν. The effect of this is to identify the fifth hipparchy as the *agema* (or rather, to remove the *agema* altogether) and contrast a fifth, barely

¹⁶⁰ Arr. vii 12.4; on this matter see Badian (n. 52) 38 f.; Bosworth (n. 69) 125.

¹⁶¹ Arr. vii 25.2 (from the *Ephemerides*); cf. Plut. *Al.* 76.3 with Hamilton's notes.

¹⁶² Contrast Berve (n. 5) 157: 'Und es kann kaum

einem Zweifel unterliegen, dass Alexander auch den aus Makedonien zu erwartenden Nachschub mit iranischen Elementen . . . in ähnlicher Weise zu verbinden beabsichtigte.'

infiltrated, hipparchy with four more heavily Oriental hipparchies. The gloss presupposed is difficult. Explanatory glosses in Arrian are usually rudimentary, whereas here we have a very sophisticated inference by the scribal commentator, identifying the fifth hipparchy with the *agema*. Nor is the $\tau\epsilon$ 'curiously unemphatic'; it is the regular connective used to denote the last item in a series (Denniston, *Greek Particles*² 500 f.)—and the reorganisation of the *agema* is patently the last of the Macedonians' grievances.

(ii) Badian, *JHS* lxxxv (1965) 161, suggests the simple supplement <μόνον> οὐ βαρβαρικὴ ἢ πᾶσα. This creates the impression that the fifth hipparchy contrasted with the other four by its preponderance of barbarians. But the parenthesis remains curiously unhelpful. The idiom ἀλλὰ . . . γὰρ is extremely frequent in Arrian and in all cases it combines an adversative with an explanation (cf. e.g. v 13.2: οὐκ ἐς βέβαιον χωρίον ἐκβὰς . . . ἀλλὰ ἐς νῆσον γὰρ—'not onto sure ground but the reverse, for it was an island'). The negative prepares the way for the explanation and cannot be emended away.

The difficulty lies in ἐς αὐτό, which is pleonastic and vacuous. What is needed is an explanation why the fifth hipparchy was not wholly barbarian, as opposed to the four wholly Iranian hipparchies. Any attempt to solve the problem involves quite drastic surgery, but I would tentatively suggest ἐς <τ>αὐτὸ, or more explicitly ἐς <τ>αὐτὸ <τοῖς Μακεδόσι> and translate 'not entirely barbarian but partially, for when the entire cavalry was expanded some barbarians were assigned to the same unit as Macedonians'. (For Arrian's use of ἐς ταὐτό see v 25.3; *Ind.* 3.9; 10.9.) But, whatever the original sense of the parenthesis, Arrian's presentation of the Macedonian grievances is clear and logical; first the existence of hipparchies comprised wholly of Iranians and then, much worse, the fifth hipparchy in which they served with the barbarians.